

SIR RICHARD WILLIAMS FOUNDATION SPEECH
AUGUST 7, 2019

SUBJECT: Coalition Warfighting and Pacific AOR Interoperability

Joint and Coalition Warfighting in the Pacific AOR presents significant challenges that must be addressed and mitigated to enable successful operations. Operating similar equipment with similar TTPs simplifies logistics, allows for seamless coalition integration, and enables operations.

- RECOGNITION OF KEY LEADERS IN ATTENDANCE

- THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO OFFER SOME THOUGHTS ON THE IMPORTANT DISCUSSION OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS
 - THIS IS MY FIRST VISIT TO AUSTRALIA AND AS A PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZEN NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICALLY THANK THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCE FOR THEIR STEADFAST SUPPORT AS AN ALLY TO THE UNITED STATES.

- TOPIC INTRODUCTION
 - THE SUBJECT OF JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS IS AN EXPANSIVE SUBJECT AND I WON'T ATTEMPT TO BOIL THE OCEAN IN A SHORT SPEAKING OPPORTUNITY. INSTEAD I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN THE DISCUSSION AND BUILD ON THE ALREADY FANTASTIC WORK DONE IN APRIL 2017 BY THE WILLIAMS FOUNDATION IN AN EARLIER SEMINAR ENTITLED '**DESIGNING THE INTEGRATED FORCE**'. THIS EXCELLENT SEMINAR FOCUSED ON MANY OF THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS FACING THE DESIGN OF A NEW DEFENSE FORCE AND I FOUND THE REPORT TO BE EXCEPTIONALLY CANDID AND EXTENSIVE.
 - FURTHERMORE, I APPRECIATE THE TREMENDOUS WORK DONE IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR BY THE WILLIAMS FOUNDATION SEMINAR ON **HI-INTENSITY OPERATIONS AND SUSTAINING SELF-RELIANCE**. THE

STRATEGIC DISCUSSION ON THE CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE NATIONAL IMPERATIVE TO REVIEW HOW BEST TO PROVIDE FOR SELF-DEFENSE IN LIGHT OF CHANGING POLITICAL ALLIANCES IS AN IMPORTANT DISCUSSION. AUSTRALIA'S DECISION ON HOW BEST TO PROVIDE FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HER PARTICIPATION AS AN ANZUS PARTNER WILL NO DOUBT SHAPE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE POLICY AND FORCE DESIGN. I STILL REMAIN CONFIDENT THAT WHEN SHE ELECTS TO FIGHT AS A JOINT FORCE OR PART OF A COALITION, OPTIMIZING COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REMAINS A CRITICAL GOAL.

- FOR THE NEXT FEW MINUTES WITH YOUR FOREBEARANCE, I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS THE DISCUSSION FROM THE LOFTY TOPICS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FORCE DESIGN TO THE ADRELINE PUMPING TOPIC OF INTEROPERABILITY.

- MANY OF YOU MAY KNOW THE NAME **CONRAD HILTON**. HE WAS BY ALL ACCOUNTS AMERICA'S FIRST AND MOST PROLIFIC HOTEL OWNER – IN FACT EARLY IN THE 20TH CENTURY HE WAS WELL KNOWN FOR OWNING THE LARGEST HOTELS AND ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL CHAIN THAT TRANSFORMED TOURISM AND BUSINESS – GIVEN WHERE HE TOOK HILTON CORPORATION HE MAY APPROPRIATELY BE VIEWED AS A STRATEGIC THINKER FOR SURE! NOT KNOWN FOR MAKING MANY SPEECHES HE WAS ASKED VERY LATE IN LIFE BY JOHNNY CARSON AS HE APPEARED ON THE TONIGHT SHOW IF HE HAD A MESSAGE FOR AMERICA. HE TURNED TOWARD THE TV CAMERA AND VERY SOLEMNLY SAID, '**PLEASE, PUT THE SHOWER CURTAIN INSIDE THE TUB**'.
 - HIS MESSAGE WHILE UNDERWHELMING STRATEGICALLY, WAS EMINENTLY PRACTICAL – HARDLY THEORETICAL.

- I CONSIDER MYSELF A PRACTICAL WARRIOR SO, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS A VERY PRACTICAL ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH JOINT (MULTI-SERVICE) AND COMBINED (MULTI-NATION) OPERATIONS; THE CHALLENGE OF INTEROPERABILITY.
 - **Interoperability refers to the ability of different military organizations to conduct joint operations. These organizations can be of different**

nationalities or different armed services (ground, naval and air forces) OR both.

- **Interoperability allows forces, units or systems to operate together.**
- BASIC INTEROPERABILITY TO MOVE, SHOOT AND COMMUNICATE AS A JOINT OR COMBINED FORCE IS CHALLENGING ENOUGH BUT WE SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE GRADUATE LEVEL INTEROPERABILITY; USING PARTNER FORCE'S EQUIPMENT, LIVING AND SUSTAINING WITH SIMILAR RESOURCES ON LAND AND SEA, ACHIEVING A SEAMLESS COMMAND AND CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK AMONG PARTNER FORCES, AND ULTIMATELY CONSIDERING COMBINED ORGANIZATIONS WHERE WE CAN TRULY OPTIMIZE COMBAT POWER REGARDLESS OF CONTRIBUTING SERVICE OR COUNTRY. SOME OF THESE DESCRIPTIONS HAVE RISK AND CHALLENGE OUR TRADITIONAL MODES OF OPERATION NO DOUBT BUT WE SHOULD NOT LIMIT OURSELVES TO A SINGLE SERVICE OR SINGLE PARTNER NATION SOLUTION IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE POTENTIAL OF INTEROPERABILITY.
- THE 2017 SEMINAR AND REPORT TOUCHED A BIT ON THE CHALLENGES INVOLVED WITH SERVICE CULTURE LEADING TO STOVE PIPED ACQUISITION. I WILL LEAVE ACQUISITION REFORM TO A MORE QUALIFIED SPEAKER BUT IN MY OPINION, AN ACQUISITION STRATEGY FOCUSED WITH INTEROPERABILITY AS A KEY FACTOR DOES HAVE POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS; AND COST AVOIDANCE.
- I WOULD COMMEND THE SEVEN EXCELLENT HYPOTHESES DEVELOPED BY THE 2017 SEMINAR ON INTEGRATED FORCE DESIGN AND THE OVERARCHING THEME OF JOINT OPERATIONS FOUND IN THE RESPECTIVE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE STRATEGIC PLANS.
- ONE OF THE UNDERLYING QUOTES IN THE REPORT STRUCK ME AS THE CENTRAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE:
 - ***'IF YOU DO NOT SET THE OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO OPTIMIZE COMBAT CAPABILITY AND CONSIDER THAT SHAPING THE JOINT EFFECT AS A KEY MEANS TO DOING SO, THEN THE CHALLENGE IS CLEAR; HOW DO YOU GET A STRATEGIC HANDLE ON WHERE YOUR FORCE IS MOVING TO AND HOW***

DO YOU ENSURE IT IS AS EFFECTIVE AND SUSTAINABLE AS POSSIBLE?'

- I COULD NOT AGREE MORE WITH THE ASSERTION THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF ANY FORCE DESIGN, PROCESS OR OPERATIONAL DECISION SHOULD BE TO OPTIMIZE COMBAT CAPABILITY OR JOINT EFFECTS. IN THIS SPIRIT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THREE DISTINCT ASPECTS OF **INTEROPERABILITY** AS A KEY ELEMENT OF EFFECTIVE JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS:
 - NATIONAL AND SERVICE CULTURE
 - PARTNER RELATIONSHIP MAINTENANCE
 - LEADER SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT

- NATIONAL AND SERVICE CULTURES
 - THERE IS IN MY VIEW, STRONG OPERATIONAL VALUE IN THE UNIQUE NATIONAL VIEW OF COMBINED FORCE PARTNERS AND THE UNIQUE SERVICE CULTURES OF JOINT FORCE PARTNERS. ACHIEVING A BETTER JOINT EFFECT REQUIRES SENIOR OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS TO UNDERSTAND, ACCEPT AND RESPECT THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRAINTS APPROPRIATELY IMPOSED BY RESPECTIVE PARTNERS (LARGE AND SMALL).
 - THE MOST RECENT LARGE COMBINED OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE PROVIDED MANY SEMINAL LESSONS ABOUT EMPLOYING A JOINT AND COMBINED FORCE AFTER THE NATIONAL LEADERS HAVE DECIDED FORCE IS TO BE EMPLOYED. IN MY AREA OF OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, I WAS FORTUNATE TO HAVE ASSIGNED IRAQI, POLISH, JAPANESE, EL SALVADORIAN, ROMANIAN AND GEORGIAN UNITS; JUST TO MY SOUTH WERE THE BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN FORCES WHOM WE COOPERATED WITH EXTENSIVELY ALONG A COMMON BORDER. EACH NATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER WENT ABOUT HIS MISSION IN HIS AREA IN A UNIQUE MANNER. IN MY OPINION, THE STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF EACH COUNTRY'S FORCE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER INTEGRATED TO MAKE FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE FORCE. OUR INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS AT TIMES TO SURRENDER SOME CONTROL AND UNEASE WITH TASK

ORGANIZING FORCES FROM DIFFERENT NATIONS DIMINISHED OUR COMBINED EFFECT.

- THE PRACTICAL ABILITY OF A PARTNER COUNTRY'S FORCE TO INTEROPERATE WAS EXTREMELY LIMITED. WHILE DIFFERENT EQUIPMENT PRESENTED OBSTACLES, ONE OF THE MOST CHALLENGING AREAS WAS THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED COMMAND AND CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE NETWORK.
- AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL IT IS DIFFICULT TO BUILD TRUST AND UNITY OF EFFORT WHEN COMMANDERS ARE SIMPLY UNABLE TO COMMAND AND CONTROL OPERATIONS ON A COMMON NETWORK. ANY MEANINGFUL ATTEMPT AT INTEROPERABILITY IN MY OPINION HAS TO START WITH A COMMON NETWORK.
- THE DIFFERENT SERVICE CULTURES CAN PRESENT STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN DECISION-MAKING AS WELL.
- AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL SERVICE LEADERS ALL SEEK TO MAN, TRAIN AND EQUIP THEIR FORCES FOR THE FUTURE. DESPITE OUR BEST INTENTIONS TO SEEK JOINT EFFECTS AND INTEROPERABLE FORCES, WE TOO OFTEN ALLOW OUR OWN SERVICE BIAS TO FOCUS DISPROPORTIONATELY ON AIR, GROUND OR MARITIME CAPABILITY AND SINGLE SERVICE SOLUTIONS. TWO TRUTHS HAVE EMERGED OVER THE LAST CENTURY: WE DO NOT PREDICT THE NEXT WAR WITH MUCH ACCURACY AND WE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE CAPABLE FIGHTING AS A JOINT FORCE. UNFORTUNATELY, TIGHT BUDGET COMPETITION, OVERLY-CONFIDENT PLANNERS, AND SERVICE PRIORITIES TO ENHANCE RELEVANCE FREQUENTLY LEAD US TO SOLUTIONS IL-SUITED TO THE EVENTUAL CONFLICT WE END UP FACING. OUR RECENT CHALLENGES RECOGNIZING EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES LIKE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES, HYPERSONIC WEAPONS, AND CYBER ATTACKS ARE SOME VERY RECENT CHALLENGES WE MAY HAVE ADDRESSED BETTER.
- SERVICE CULTURES CAN ALSO PRESENT OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL CHALLENGES THAT ARE EXACERBATED WHEN OPERATING AS A COMBINED FORCE. THE PRACTICAL REQUIREMENT TO INTERPRET AND UNDERSTAND MISSION TASKS IS SUBJECT TO SERVICE CULTURE FILTERS.

- GIVEN THE TACTICAL TASK TO 'CLEAR AN OBJECTIVE' AS AN EXAMPLE, ONE SERVICE MIGHT DROP LEAFLETS ASKING THE ENEMY TO DEPART THE AREA, ANOTHER MIGHT SEND ENGINEERS TO LEVEL THE OBJECTIVE WITH BULL DOZERS, ONE MIGHT JUST SAIL AWAY FROM IT, AND ANOTHER MIGHT KILL EVERY LIVING ORGANISM ON THE OBJECTIVE RENDERING IT UNSUITABLE FOR FUTURE USE!
- THE COMMANDER ISSUING THE ORDER TO 'CLEAR' THE OBJECTIVE MAY HAVE HAD A VERY DIFFERENT OUTCOME IN MIND.
- COMPOUNDING THE SERVICE CULTURE BIAS WITH COUNTRY SPECIFIC CULTURES OR NATIONAL CAVEATS MAKES CLARITY OF DIRECTIVES A KEY PRACTICAL CHALLENGE IN EFFECTIVE INTEROPERABILITY. THE DEFAULT SOLUTION IN MANY OF OUR MOST RECENT EXAMPLES HAS BEEN TO DECONFLICT OPERATIONAL TASKS AND AREAS VICE ACHIEVE THE SYNERGY WE SEEK THROUGH INTEROPERABILITY.
- SERVICE CULTURE HAS A VERY REAL IMPACT ON HOW WE RECEIVE, INTERPRET AND EXECUTE ASSIGNED TASKS AND THAT PRESENTS A CHALLENGE TO OPTIMIZING COMBAT CAPABILITY. THE CHALLENGE BEFORE US IS: HOW DO WE SUSTAIN THE VALUE OF OUR UNIQUE SERVICE CULTURES AND UNIQUE CAPABILITIES AND STILL ACHIEVE INTEROPERABILITY?

- PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS
 - ANY HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP STARTS WITH A SHARED SET OF OBJECTIVES AND MUTUAL RESPECT; MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS ARE NO DIFFERENT. LIKEWISE, ANY DURABLE RELATIONSHIP REQUIRES ATTENTION, COMMITMENT AND SHARED SACRIFICE IN ORDER FOR THE PARTNERS TO OPERATE SEAMLESSLY.
 - THE PLACEMENT OF LIASION OFFICERS IN PARTNER HEADQUARTERS IS VERY HELPFUL. PROVIDING SENIOR OFFICERS LIKE COMMODORE CHAMPION, ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY SERVING ON IDOPACOM STAFF AND MG MCDANIEL, AUSTRALIAN ARMY SERVING AS DEPUTY COMMANDER, US ARMY PACIFIC IS CENTRAL TO INTEROPERABILITY AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.
 - WITNESS THE WONDERFUL WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF THE US MARINE ROTATIONAL FORCE – DARWIN, THE 31ST MARINE

EXPEDITIONARY UNIT AND AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE FORCE. CONDUCTING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IS INHERENTLY JOINT AND THIS PARTNER RELATIONSHIP HAS MORE POTENTIAL THAN MOST TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT INTEROPERABILITY FROM A COMMON MISSION SET, EQUIPMENT AND SUSTAINMENT.

- ADDITIONALLY, THE BIENNIAL TALISMAN SABRE EXERCISE AND OTHER EXERCISES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AREA OF OPERATIONS ARE PARAMOUNT TO IMPROVING INTEROPERABILITY. THIS YEAR WE WITNESSED US MARINE CORPS ATTACK AND UTILITY HELICOPTERS OPERATING FROM ROYAL AUSTRALIAN WARSHIPS AS A SUPERB EXAMPLE.
- AS WELL, INDUSTRY PROFESSIONALS KNOW THAT THEIR ARMED FORCE PARTNER CUSTOMERS HAVE A REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS AT A REASONABLE PRICE WITH DEPENDABLE SERVICE AFTER THE SALE. INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN JOINT AND COMBINED ARMED FORCE UNITS CAN BE GREATLY ENHANCED THROUGH INDUSTRY PARTNER SUPPORT. IN MY OPINION, THIS BEGINS WITH INDUSTRY PARTNERS WORKING TO FASHION SOLUTIONS THAT ALLOW DIFFERENT SERVICES AND THE COMBINED FORCE PARTNERS TO CONSIDER SIMILAR EQUIPMENT AND PROCESSES WHENEVER POSSIBLE ACROSS MULTI-SERVICE AND COUNTRY REQUIREMENTS. PROPRIETARY CONTROL AND SINGLE USE SOLUTIONS DO NOT ENHANCE INTEROPERABILITY OR ADDRESS COST CHALLENGES OF PARTNER NATIONS.
- LEADER SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT
 - TECHNOLOGY HAS CAUSED COMBAT TO EVOLVE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF WARFARE; BUT LEADERS (HUMANS) STILL PLAY THE DOMINANT ROLE IN OPERATIONS AND I BELIEVE THAT HUMAN LEADERSHIP WILL REMAIN DOMINANT INTO THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE.
 - OF COURSE, I THOUGHT THAT THE INTERNET WAS A FAD AND WOULD NEVER LAST.
 - A FORMER SENIOR COMBINED FORCE COMMANDER USED TO SAY THAT IN COMPLEX TIMES TWO DOMINANT LEADERSHIPS STYLES EMERGE; BOTH ARE EFFECTIVE BUT VASTLY DIFFERENT IN EXECUTION

AND HAVE TANGIBLE IMPACT ON INTEROPERABILITY OF SUBORDINATE FORCES.

- ONE TYPE LEADER SEEKS TO CENTRALIZE, STANDARDIZE, AND CONTROL
 - THE OTHER SEEKS TO DECENTRALIZE, ENCOURAGE, AND EMPOWER.
- WE MAY THINK THE FORMER CAN REDUCE AMBIGUITY AND IMPROVE DISCIPLINE IN A JOINT AND COMBINED FORCE AND THUS REDUCE RISK; BUT HE MAY ALSO INHIBIT OPEN DIALOGUE AMONG PARTNERS AND APPLY SOLUTIONS BROADLY THAT ARE LATE TO NEED AND IL-SUITED SPECIFICALLY IN AN EVOLVING ENVIRONMENT.
 - WE MAY ASSESS THE LATTER MAY INTRODUCE TOO MUCH SUBORDINATE FREEDOM OF ACTION AND INVITE UNINTENDED, UNCOORDINATED OR INCONSISTENT SOLUTIONS.
 - I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TYPE LEADER SELECTED TO LEAD A JOINT OR COMBINED FORCE MAKES HIS/HER SELECTION A PARAMOUNT TASK OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP.
 - NAPOLEON IS QUOTED AS SAYING, '*THE PERSONALITY OF THE GENERAL IS INDISPENSIBLE*'. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SUM OF OUR EXPERIENCES, BIAS, AND INATE PERSONALITY HAS AN EFFECT ON OUR ABILITY TO LEAD. THE QUESTION I ASK IS, DOES AN EFFECTIVE JOINT OR COMBINED LEADER REQUIRE SPECIFIC SKILLS AND PERSONALITY TRAITS? AND IF SO, ARE WE SELECTING THE RIGHT ONES AND DEVELOPING THEM APPROPRIATELY?
 - IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, MUCH EFFORT AND ENERGY IS SPENT ON DESIGNING THE 'COMMAND RELATIONSHIP' TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT TO DETERMINE WHO MAY DIRECT WHOM. THE 'RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMANDERS' ALWAYS ENDS UP BEING MUCH MORE VALUABLE TO EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS THAN THE WIRING DIAGRAM WE SPEND SO MUCH TIME ON. THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED COMMANDERS IS CRITICAL TO INTEROPERABILITY AND OPTIMIZING THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF ALL PARTNER UNITS. THIS IS NEVER SO TRUE AS WHEN THERE IS DISSONANCE ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL BETWEEN STRATEGIC GOALS OR METHODS BETWEEN THE PARTNER GOVERNMENTS.

- I BELIEVE THAT SOME EFFECTIVE LEADERS IN PEACETIME ARE PROBLEMATIC IN WAR AND THEIR UNDERLYING PERSONALITY MAY PRESENT OBSTACLES COMMANDING A JOINT OR COMBINED TEAM.
- BRITISH HISTORIAN AND MAJOR GENERAL, J.F.C. FULLER AUTHORED A NICE LITTLE PAMPHLET ENTITLED, 'GENERALSHIP, ITS DISEASES AND THEIR CURES'. IN IT HE HIGHLIGHTS THE PERSONAL FACTOR IN COMMAND BY CITING THE ARCHDUKE ALBERT'S VIEW,
 - *"THERE ARE PLENTY OF SMALL- MINDED MEN WHO IN TIME OF PEACE, EXCEL IN DETAIL, ARE INEXORABLE IN THE MATTERS OF EQUIPMENT AND DRILL, AND PERPETUALLY INTERFERE WITH THE WORK OF THEIR SUBORDINATES. THEY THUS ACQUIRE AN UNMERITED REPUTATION, AND RENDER THE SERVICE A BURDEN, BUT THEY ABOVE ALL DO MISCHIEF IN PREVENTING DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUALITY, AND IN RETARDING THE ADVANCEMENT OF INDEPENDENT AND CAPABLE SPIRITS. WHEN WAR ARISES THE SMALL MINDS, WORN OUT BY ATTENTION TO TRIFLES, ARE INCAPABLE OF EFFORT, AND FAIL MISERABLY.'*
- SERVICE SPECIFIC EXPERTISE IS NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR EFFECTIVE JOINT AND COMBINED COMMAND. SO, LOOKING CRITICALLY AT INDIVIDUAL LEADERS AND CLOSELY MANAGING THEIR DEVELOPMENT IS CENTRAL TO EFFECTIVE INTEROPERABILITY.
- IN MY OWN EXPERIENCE, HAVING 9 DIFFERENT BRIGADE COMMANDERS REPORT DIRECTLY TO ME AT DIFFERENT TIMES OVER THE SAME YEAR IN IRAQ, I FOUND EACH TO HAVE UNIQUE SKILLS AND PERSONALITIES – ESPECIALLY GIVEN THEIR SPECIFIC BRANCH CULTURE. UNFORTUNATELY, NOT HAVING A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL OF THESE SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS IN ADVANCE OF THEIR ARRIVAL TO THE COMBAT ZONE WAS AN OBSTACLE TO EFFECTIVE INTEROPERABILITY. WE WORKED THROUGH IT, BUT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR MISUNDERSTANDING AT A CRITICAL TIME LEFT ME THINKING THIS WAS AN AREA WORTH IMPROVEMENT. I BELIEVE MORE DISCUSSION AND STUDY IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE IF THERE ARE UNIQUE SKILLS OR PERSONALITY TRAITS DESIRED IN JOINT AND COMBINED COMMANDERS SO THAT WE MAY IDENTIFY, DEVELOP AND SELECT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEADERS FOR THIS SPECIFIC TASK. ADDITIONALLY, WE

NEED TO MAKE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRUE RELATIONSHIPS TO BE BUILT IN ADVANCE OF COMBAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

- CONCLUSION

- INTEROPERABILITY IS OFTEN ADDRESSED AFTER A JOINT OR COMBINED OPERATION HAS BEGUN AND THE WORK-AROUNDS OR MITIGATION STRATEGIES CAN OFTEN APPEAR TO BE MORE TAXING THAN THE VALUE OF WORKING TOGETHER. SIMPLY PUT, THE JUICE IS FREQUENTLY NOT WORTH THE SQUEEZE. SO, WE SEEK DECONFLICTION OF TASK AND OR OPERATIONAL AREA RATHER THAN SYNERGY.
- IN THE SEMINAR REPORT FROM 2017 ON DESIGNING AN INTEGRATED FORCE, THERE WERE NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO THE TENDENCY TO APPROACH JOINTNESS IN A STOVE PIPE MANNER AND THEN COBBLE TOGETHER SERVICE CAPABILITIES FOR AN OPERATION. THIS USUALLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE SYNERGY THAT WAS DESIRED. SEEKING TO 'OPTIMIZE COMBAT CAPABILITY' FROM THE OUTSET AND ALLOW THIS PRIORITY OBJECTIVE TO DRIVE SERVICE DECISIONS SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO THINKING ABOUT INTEROPERABILITY IN COMBINED OPERATIONS. THIS REQUIRES LEADERS WITH POLITICAL COURAGE AND SELFLESSNESS TO THE GREATER GOOD.
- NOT WITHSTANDING THE VAGERIES OF POLITICS AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE FUTURE SECURITY SITUATION, THERE IS FAIRLY CONSISTENT UNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHO THE STRATEGIC DEMOCRATIC PARTNERS ARE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AREA. PRACTICAL INTEROPERABILITY FUNCTIONS AND SIMILAR EQUIPMENT USE BUILDS CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTNER FORCES THAT WHEN DIRECTED, THEY CAN OPERATE SEAMLESSLY. IT REDUCES RISK TO OPERATIONS THROUGH COMMON PROCESS AND CONTROL MEASURES, AND IT BOLSTERS DETERRENCE AGAINST POTENTIAL ENEMIES BY DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVE COMBAT CAPABILITY AS A TEAM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INTEROPERABILITY IS SOMETIMES LOST DURING THE REQUIREMENTS BUILD AND ACQUISITION PROCESS – LONG BEFORE HOSTILITIES.
- IT SEEMS PRUDENT FOR INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERS TO CONTINUE TO BUILD INTEROPERABILITY INTO THE FORCE AND OPERATIONAL PROCESSES WE EXPECT TO EXECUTE IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT; BEFORE THE CONFLICT ARISES.

- I BELIEVE INTEROPERABILITY DOES NOT HAVE TO DAMAGE SELF-RELIANCE OR SOVEREIGNTY BUT INSTEAD SERVE AS A PRACTICAL LENS TO REVIEW DECISIONS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF OPTIMIZING COMBAT POWER. THERE IS A BALANCE NO DOUBT BETWEEN THE INHERENT NATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR SELF-DEFENSE, MAINTAINING ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY CAPACITY, AND AFFORDABILITY. BY DESIGNING PROCESSES, PLATFORMS AND DOCTRINE THAT ENABLE PARTNERS TO WORK TOGETHER SEAMLESSLY, WE ACHIEVE THE SYNERGY WE SEEK AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL ON UNITY OF OBJECTIVES AND THE MUNDANE TASKS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT.
 - MY CLOSING THOUGHT IS THAT WHILE WE FACE MANY CHALLENGES WITH INTEROPERABILITY IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, WE CAN AND SHOULD COMMIT AND RESOURCE TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE AS A JOINT AND COMBINED FORCE ON A REGULAR AND RECURRING SCHEDULE. WE CAN THEN CANDIDLY CRITIQUE OUR PERFORMANCE TOWARDS ACHIEVING BETTER INTEROPERABILITY.
 - AGAIN, I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE WITH YOU TODAY AND I APPRECIATE YOUR KIND ATTENTION. I LOOK FORWARD TO ANY THOUGHTS OR QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.
-