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Dr Robbin Laird, Conceptualizing Australia’s Maritime Strategy and Shaping a Government Approach, 24 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) I followed up with Jennifer Parker on April 19, 2024 with regard to her presentation on how to conceptualize Australian maritime strategic interests and strategy. We focused on how she conceptualized the strategy and the needed approach as much wider than a focus on ADF capabilities. We discussed the need for reforming the Australian Defense Force’s structure to address 21st century security challenges. We highlighted in our discussion the importance of involving society and the economy in a broader conversation about defense and security, and the need for expedited capability acquisition to address existing gaps and emerging threats. We finally focused on the challenge to shape a more ambitious approach to defense organization design, involving a broader societal and economic involvement to address capacity issues and maximize government capacity. Parker started by arguing that “in Australia, we jump to the capability conversation to quickly.” She argued that any consideration of national security strategy must start with assessing Australia’s critical vulnerabilities across various domains, including political warfare, cyber warfare, and space which affects its maritime interests. Maritime strategy then would be part of such an approach. And when done in this manner, Parker argues that “we need to address organizational structure and how we have organized ourselves to deal with our vulnerabilities.” Doing so will underscore the need for restructuring national agencies and departments to better address these vulnerabilities, with a focus on linking up broader considerations and authorities to do so. This suggests or reinforces the need for a national security architecture to coordinate maritime security efforts. In such an architecture one key organizational issue to be dealt with is the lack of data sharing across fleets and departments, and the need for a central authority to address security crises. Such a re-think then would lead to a broader engagement of the society and the economic leaders in shaping such a national strategy which would be inclusive of a maritime one. Parker put it this way: “The third thing to do after focusing on vulnerabilities and government restructuring is to be really open with the public about what’s happening, and why we need these changes.” This is a version of my own argument that simply pursuing a national security strategy in age where global security challenges are diffuse within our societies is simply continuing the role if national security decision makers as some sort of high priesthood. The broader engagement of the society and economy is critical. Evolving defense needs rely increasingly on a security base which is not narrowly about defense. Much or perhaps most of the technologies to be mastered for defense come from the commercial sector. The flow of dual use technologies has changed from defense to the civil economy to operating the other way around. Based on such a re-set the ADF needs to review its structure to address multiple domains of operations as it proceeds with its multi-domain integration. We then discussed the capability issues. How does Australia address its gaps in Navy capabilities, particularly in submarines and ships, in a more urgent manner? Parker underscored that the Navy’s capability acquisition process needs reform in order to move faster and be more responsive to changing needs. I mentioned my discussions with a senior U,S, Admiral who focused on their need to fill capabilities gaps with new or extant technologies, but the U.S. acquisition process simply does not allow them to do so. The same is true of Australia, and this especially significant as contributions from autonomous systems – air and maritime – which are software driven payload carriers — become especially significant in force redesign an meeting shortfalls in the short and medium term. Their constant redesign as use dictates a new approach whereby the users and the developers need to be working in an ongoing and continuous process of changing these systems based on real world experience. When the Plan Jericho approach was launched by the RAAF one of the key themes identified was the need to enable software transient advantages for the force compared to an adversary. This is evident now in the coming of autonomous systems and how to include them in the force, but the challenge of how data is generated by the force and used in a whole of government maritime security and defense effort only is worsened by the coming of these systems. There needs to be organizational change in the ADF and in whole of government in order to effectively employ these new platforms – who are not covered at all by the legacy acquisition process – to the benefit of the ADF, the Maritime Border Command and to the Australian government. When such a re-design is pursued then the workforce problem changes as well. Parker emphasized the need to shift from a more traditional conversation of recruitment and retention to how agencies are organized for cross domain capacity. How to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of the government cross domain to deliver the necessary decisions in the right time? How to use the workforce more effectively and to assess the ability to deliver desired effects is even more important than managing the extant workforce to increase its numbers as the ADF seeks to expand.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping Space for Autonomous Systems in the Operating Force: The Case of the Loyal Wingman, 23 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) In the re-direction of Australian defence underway by the Labor government, a key challenge will be to make progress in the three to five years ahead for the ADF and the nation in meeting the growing global threats, while investments are being made to shape a different force down the road. In such an effort, shaping a space for autonomous systems to assist in the process is an important aspect. But as I have argued in my recent book on The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems, such systems complement the manned force, they don’t replace. In fact, they will be incorporated not with a replacement of platform logic but as a kill web logic: how do these platforms as payload enablers add specific capability to solve key problems facing the force? They are not one to one platform replacements which means that the logic for their inclusion in the forces is not inherited from the past but is part of shaping an innovative way forward. What these systems provide are payloads which can assist in various tasks to augment the lethality and survivability of the manned force. A good example of what is entailed is the Loyal Wingman program in Australia. In a February 9, 2024 press release this is what the government said about the program: The Albanese Government has secured hundreds of highly skilled jobs while driving innovation in Australia’s local defence industry with the allocation of an additional $399 million for the ongoing development of the MQ-28A Ghost Bat. The MQ-28A Ghost Bat, known as a Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), is being developed in cooperation with Boeing Defence Australia. It is the first military combat aircraft to be designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years. An entirely new technology, it is designed to act as a loyal wingman which will be able to protect and support our military assets and pilots and undertake a wide range of activities across large distances, including performing combat roles. The Government is now moving forward with the next stage of the program, including delivery of three Block 2 aircraft which have an enhanced design and improved capabilities. This funding boost will enable a focus on developing sensor and mission payloads, an integrated combat system and autonomous systems. The additional funding announced today also secures over 350 jobs across Australia and will ensure ongoing work for over 200 suppliers, supporting the local defence industry and further contributing to well-paid employment opportunities for Australians. The further development of MQ-28A Ghost Bat comes after the Government agreed with a Defence Strategic Review recommendation that options be developed for collaboration and technology sharing with the United States. In line with the Government’s response, Defence signed a CCA development project arrangement with the United States on 30 March 2023. More than 70 per cent of the MQ-28A Ghost Bat delivery program is being directed towards Australian industry content, delivering substantial benefits to local companies and their highly skilled workforces. Quotes attributable to Minister for Defence Industry, the Hon Pat Conroy MP: “This is the first military aircraft to be designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years and underscores the depth of innovation and expertise in our defence industry. “More than 200 Australian companies have already contributed to the MQ-28A program, including more than 50 small and medium enterprises within the supply chain. This project demonstrates that with the appropriate support from government, Australia’s defence industry can continue to be a world leader and a key source of jobs. “The prosperity and security of our nation and will always be a top priority for the Albanese Government. That’s why giving our Air Force the critical capabilities it needs to protect Australians, and their interests, is paramount.” Ok, but what problem is the new air system being designed to solve? Where will it fit into the force? And how does it add capability without burdening the sustainment enterprise within the ADF itself? I had a chance to discuss the way ahead with Group Captain Darren Clare, Director Combat Futures. As the first squadron commander of the F-35, Clare has a good sense of the direction of air combat power, and is now working the issue of where a new autonomous air system would contribute most in the mid-term and thereby lay down capabilities for expanded use in the longer term. Commander Air Combat Group, Air Commodore Tim Alsop (left) and Commanding Officer of No. 3 Squadron, Wing Commander Darren Clare in front of A35-010 which has been temporarily rebranded in celebration of Mr Felix Sainsbury on his 100th Birthday. Credit: Australian Department of Defence, May 14, 2020 A core problem facing the new generation of autonomous systems beyond the question of how to develop and build them is where to incorporate them in the force. A loyal wingman is a key point, for a fifth-generation air force does not operate with wingmen in the legacy sense but in new ways in much wider formations. They are part of a kill web, so the place for the payloads on such an air system will be found in terms of what they can contribute that the combat force finds useful. Where do they fit into the force? How can they be sustained and operated by the force? And what payloads can be credibly used by the officers charged with the authorities to use combat power for kinetic purposes? In other words, determining where they fit into the force is crucial to ensure that we are not simply focusing on science projects, rather than on assets which are sustainable parts of an operating joint force. For such capabilities to be significant, they must be more than aspirational: they must be in the hands of warfighters who understand what problems they are solving for the combat force. In the discussion with GPCAPT Clare he underscored a number of key points which need to be addressed in order to bring the new systems into the operating force. First, there is a need to demonstrate credible, achievable roles for autonomous systems. Second, the demands placed on the operational force are significant and for the new systems to be adopted there is a need to convince commanders of new system’s worth. Third, the squadron commander needs to be able to control and provide feedback on autonomous systems in real-time. Fourth, to progress to use, it is clear that experimentation and prototyping of autonomous systems are needed to find the best way to integrate them into the Air Force. Above all, the importance of understanding the problem being solved with autonomous systems, and why they are better than traditional systems needs to be demonstrated to convince warfighters to use the capability and to figure how best to integrate it into the force in ways that enhance rather than degrade operational performance. One of my favorite examples of the limits of technology not integrated is how useful the introduction of radar was to the U.S. forces in Hawaii in dealing with the Pearl Harbor attack. An example of how to integrate new systems into an integrated force was Air Marshal Dowding and his crafting of integrated system for air defense of Britain rather than simply having a single new technology – radar – introduced to the force. It is clear at least in my view that an early credible use of such an air system would be to carry payloads which could make the new aircraft a node in a kill web, which could move data from Triton and distribute to the joint force. Frankly, I think that weaponizing such a system is down the road but enhancing the contribution of P-8s and Tritons in terms of distributing data in the battlespace particularly with AI routing is a much nearer term capability which be valued by the operational force. And perhaps this would happen earlier in the operational force if the new aircraft would not be managed by a squadron, but by an organization like the Surveillance and Response Group as part of their providing data to the joint force. But getting on with use rather than conceiving of this program as if it were a traditional replacement air platform is critical if the ADF is to receive benefit from the program in the three to five year period in front of the ADF that needs to avoid a valley of reduced capability to pay for the future force. Credit Photo: The Airpower Teaming System – ‘Loyal Wingman’ prototype aircraft during a flight over Woomera, South Australia. Credit: Australian Department of Defence, September 29, 2021.

Dr Robbin Laird, Air Power in Australia’s Maritime Strategy, 21 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) This was the title of the presentation by Chris McInnes, a noted Australian airpower and defence analyst, to the April 11, 2024 Williams Foundation Seminar. He provided an overview of how airpower made unique contributions to Australian defence by providing rapid strike options throughout the Australian areas of interest. McInnes highlighted air power’s ability to provide rapid engagement and could do so over extensive operational space to deliver desired effects. He argued that in times of an effects-based approach, airpower transforms the time and space dimension for Australia’s maritime strategy. Airpower provides cost-effective options for Australia’s national security and cost-effectiveness should be prioritized in Australia’s maritime strategy of denial, focusing on delivering large amounts of high explosives to hard targets like warships, airfields, and ports. Indeed, his presentation was an argument that airpower provided a cost-effective way to deliver massive firepower at range. His analysis led to his argument that airpower gives Australia time and space to plan, act, and move effectively. This means that prioritizing investment in air superiority to avoid second-best hand in high-stakes situations is crucial. The presentation can be broken down into three core efforts. The first was to look back at World War II and examine airpower’s key role in the Pacific campaign. It played a crucial and decisive impact on the enemy prior to any other means to encroach on the Japanese advances in the Pacific. A combined arms campaign was necessary to recover territory seized by the Japanese empire, but air power was the tip of the spear and a core element of the ability of the allied air forces from sea and land to destroy enemy forces. The second revolved around the question of the time-space functionality of airpower. Every platform in the joint force is a time-space entity with core characteristics which define what it is able to do. Airpower can move at speed and range no ship can; ships provide slower moving capabilities which can build out a presence force. As he argued: “We can swiftly respond with airpower across huge distances with different options in different places on different days. We have more options available and more time in which to consider them. “But it works both ways. Three hours from Darwin is also three hours to Darwin. PLA airpower can and does hold Australia and its assets at risk across our region in a discretionary, scalable and sustainable manner and in hours, not days. It has already disrupted Australia’s sense of time and space. We are inside our warning time. “I don’t think we’ve quite latched on to what that means though. Airpower shapes how we sense and exploit time and space, which is the most precious thing for Australia and its maritime strategy.” He used a chart to visually underscore the time-space point about airpower. McInnes carefully examined the cost-benefit of weapons delivery enabled by airpower with standoff weapons from sea or land. He introduced his analysis as follows: “My analysis is limited to strike as the central operational feature of Australia’s maritime strategy of denial. I see the delivery of large amounts of high explosives as determining strike effectiveness and war, and credibility in circumstances short of war. “Australia’s maritime strategy of denial depends on our ability to deliver large and concentrated amounts of high explosive at long range, we could call this impactful projection. We need to hit hard enough to stop movement in different places on different days across a huge area over and over again. The charts he showed highlighted the range, unit costs per weapon, and warhead class correlated with the launch platform to assess cost effectiveness of ADF weapons. He described the charts this way: “Unit costs are shown in U.S. dollars and are based on U.S. budget figures going back to the 70s. The unit cost of new weapons will fall as more are purchased. “The charts clearly show that the delivering the weight of explosive our maritime strategy needs is going to be very expensive, particularly if we become overly reliant on stand-off missiles rather than stand-in weapons in the bottom left corner. It is remarkable how often one reads of the ADF need for long range missiles because of the apparently short range of our air power. “We must however distinguish between stand-off range – which is the distance a weapon travels from its launcher, and which is what the first chart shows – and effective reach, which incorporates the distance the platform and weapons can rapidly cover. “When considering effective reach rather than stand-off range, the picture changes dramatically. Stand-in weapons suddenly become some of our longest-range options. “The second chart incorporates a modest strike radius for the Super Hornet, our shortest-range weapon carrying aircraft. The ADF certainly does need stand-off weapons as they have specific utility against particular targets including air defenses, but they are expensive and inefficient high explosive delivery devices. “Every exquisite component is single use and many many missiles are needed for strikes, particularly against defended targets. They must carry and do everything internally, including propulsion, navigation and communication. This forces trade-offs, often in warhead size.” “Stand-in weapons are much lower cost and almost entirely warhead, including our largest options. They do rely on expensive delivery platforms, but these are reusable, and multi-role. We do need standoff weapons for specific tasks. But once that is done, stand-in weapons are our most economical and among our longest range options for maritime strategy of denial.” He then focused on the key question of the operational infrastructure for the ADF and its operations, arguing that criticism of airpower as too dependent on vulnerable bases and supply lines overlooked the reality that these dependencies could not be avoided. This is how he put it when looking at the opportunity costs of different operations: “What are the trade-offs? “It seems unavoidable that Australia will always need bases and supplies in its north for military operations in our region. Because at some point, all operations need bases and they will all need air power of some kind. Suggestions that dispersing Australia’s assets throughout the archipelago to our north can somehow minimize these costs are hard to square. “Even assuming we hold permission to fly missiles through our neighbours airspace, the units will need to supply and defend themselves locally against air and other attack and they will still need supply lines back to Australia, which will have to be secured using air and sea power.” McInnes’s closing point was to call for a renewed emphasis on the primacy of air superiority in airpower thinking and investment. As he said: “However, we will have no options at all without air superiority. And this I contend is where we have reason for concern. In its simplest sense, air superiority is the condition under which we can operate free from prohibitive interference by the enemy. “Air superiority can be general or local in time and space, it is almost never absolute, and it is a continuous struggle. It is deeply ingrained in the design and operation of Western societies and military forces, including the ADF. It is fundamentally why Australia has an Air Force. It was explicitly the prime campaign for Australian air power until the turn of the century. “But the Western bloc has lost sight of this primacy over the last 30 years due to complacency and distraction. While the U.S. is reinvigorating it’s air superiority approach, its Air Force is struggling for funding while operating its oldest and smallest aircraft fleet since it was formed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given European air forces a rude wake up. Australia has strengths in the air but it would appear requirements exceed resources geographically and across missions. Mass and tempo are limited.” “Air superiority is a fast-moving competition and deeply unforgiving for those who fall behind. The primacy of air superiority needs to be restored, particularly as the threat grows and funding is squeezed.” Chris McInnes presenting at the Williams Foundation Seminar April 11, 2024. The really decisive aspect of his presentation and indeed what is at the core of the evolution of 21st century combat forces, is the question of payloads and platforms or what I refer to as the evolution of the kill-web force. At the heart of the evolution of fifth generation enabled operations is a significant shift in terms of the sensor-shooter relationship whereby the weapons to be fired at an adversary do not necessarily come for the platform which has the sensor which has identified the target. This is at the heart of the F-35 development which frankly is still not fully understood and comprehended in the defence analytical world. If your goal is to deliver lethal payloads, there are a variety of ways to do so. But at the heart of the issue is where are they launched from and determining what target sets determine which weapons you need and their range. With manned and uncrewed air assets, one significantly reduces the range of the weapon necessary to strike a target as opposed to being launched from land or a ship. The U.S. aircraft carriers have combined speed, mobility, and launching airpower to close the distance for the missiles being fired. To conclude, I want to build on McInnes’s focus on the need dramatically to reduce the cost of the weapons being used. I would argue that we need to build the functional equivalent of the 155mm shell used by the artillery for an air-launched missile which can be produced across the allied forces. This will not be a super long missile, probably in the range of 400 miles, but the long range TLAMS which go further are expensive and in limited supply. What this means is that the future belongs to the common air missile produced in quantity that could also be fired from the ground or sea. The functional equivalent of the role of the shells of the 88 in the German army in World War II is what I envisage.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Australian Maritime Strategy, 20 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) The Williams Foundation Seminar held on April 11, 2024 focused on how multi-domain operations could enable Australia to more effectively execute an effective Australian maritime strategy. But such a discussion pre-supposes that Australia has a maritime strategy and a fairly clear sense of what its maritime interests are which need to be protected. The government’s Defence Strategic Review last year and the recently released defence strategy certainly highlights a range of maritime capabilities which the government has focused upon to determine how best to enhance Australian defence. But what are the tools in place and the new tools which need to be acquired to enhance Australian maritime security and defence? Or in other words, there are prior questions to the question of acquiring new ships. What are the threats? How to organize for them? Who should be responsible for dealing with them? And how to deal with them most effectively with what means? The government has highlighted a central focus on a strategy of deterrence by denial. But if the Chinese seriously disrupt Australia’s ability to move goods by sea, who is denying whom? At the seminar, two presentations directly dealt with the questions of maritime strategy and security. The presentation Jennifer Parker of the National Security College of the Australian National University addressed the question of whether Australia actually has a maritime strategy and if they did what was it? The second was by the Commissioner of the Australian Border Force, Michael Outram, and dealt with the very significant question of the daunting challenges to maritime security in a period of disruption of the “rules-based” order. Parker provided a broad stroke analysis of maritime strategy, rather than reducing the discussion to what platforms and capability which Australia has to operate in the maritime domain. In her presentation she defined maritime strategy for Australia as “the plan to protect Australia’s maritime strategic interests using all aspects of national power.” Her perspective meant that she would conclude that a maritime strategy defined as deterrence by denial would be too narrow to capture the full spectrum of demands from the maritime domain that required an appropriate security and defense regime to determine and defend Australian maritime interests. She mentioned several cases of conflicts in the maritime domain which have been evident in the recent past which illustrate the broad nature of the challenges to be dealt with. One was the targeting of shipping to send a political message which is evident in what is going on in the Middle East. Given Australia’s dependence on maritime trade, this is a problem which Australia clearly needs to be prepared for. The second has been evident in both the confrontation in the Black Sea and the challenges being addressed by the Nordics and the Baltic states involving the Russians and the Baltic Sea. This is a question of port security and undersea cable protection. Here one is talking about active measures for security and defense, not simply posturing for deterrence. The third has been the importance of “information war” in the maritime domain evident in the Chinese anything but gray zone confrontation with the Philippines. The Philippines are pulling the strings on their alliance relationships to generate defence options, but they have used transparency to fight back in the information war with the Chinese. It is also the case that they are adding new defence capabilities which will allow them to counter directly Chinese aggression which again is not building a posture for deterrence by denial – it is about directly confronting the adversary, which has been a major failure, in my view, of characterizing the Chinese as operating the gray zoos. In a book review I wrote about a book dealing with China and the gray zone, I underscored the limitations of using this concept from the standpoint of shaping credible action policy: This is how I highlighted the challenge: “Western analysts have coined phrases like hybrid war and gray zones as a way to describe peer conflict below the level of general armed conflict. But such language creates a cottage industry of think tank analysts, rather than accurately portraying the international security environment. “Peer conflict notably between the liberal democracies and the 21st century authoritarian powers is conflict over global dominance and management. It is not about managing the global commons; it is about whose rules dominate and apply. Rather than being hybrid or gray, these conflicts, like most grand strategy since Napoleon, are much more about “non war” than they are about war. They shape the rules of the game to give one side usable advantage. They exploit the risk of moving to a higher intensity of confrontation. “What limits should be crossed to manipulate the risk of going to a higher intensity of competition?” In our period of history, no credible defence approach can be designed without a strong security foundation. It is not simply about the point of the spear, or the forces generated in a force design for the professional military. It is about having a society and economy built on solid foundation of security. The presentation of the Commissioner of the Australian Border Force provided a broad understanding of the need for a robust security policy to underwrite a credible maritime strategy. Michael Outram highlighted the importance of Australia’s maritime domain citing its $1 trillion in annual trade and 5% of GDP. Commissioner Outram speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar April 11, 2024. He underscored that there are wide ranging security threats in maritime domain which include illegal fishing, cyberattacks, and biosecurity risks. The challenges of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, include the resilience and agility of criminal networks and the limitations of publicly accountable bureaucracies. To deal with these challenges. the Australian Border Force (ABF) is collaborating with Pacific island nations to build capacity and address growing criminal threats, including illegal fishing and migration. The Australian Border Force (ABF) and Defence have an overlap in their missions, particularly in the maritime domain, but this overlap is not static and can shift depending on circumstances. The Maritime Border Command within ABF working with defence focus on the challenge or surveilling and monitoring vessels operating in Australia’s maritime domain. In my own view, there is a significant opportunity to leverage autonomous systems into an integrated security and defence operational culture which will be critical in order to be able to deal with the larger issues which Parker highlighted. The Commissioner went on to argue that the time was ripe for from serious rethinking about how the Australia government needs to work in this area. He identified several areas where progress needs to be made: Consider developing a new civil maritime security strategy that addresses strategic coherence, governance, funding structures, and the definition and scope of civil maritime security in light of changing geopolitical and technological conditions. Conduct a series of future focused scenario-based planning exercises to evaluate whether the current operating model or an alternative model such as an independent Coast Guard could be more effective in addressing strategic shifts over the next decade. Give serious thought to whether the regional security situation, shifts in technology, and other factors require a different strategic approach to civil maritime security and a redefining of the scope of operations. Determine if the current civil maritime strategic architecture, planning, governance, funding, and structure remains fit for purpose over the next decade. Assess if the civil maritime operating model of the past 20 years can be sustained and remains fit for the strategic purpose over the next 20 years. He concluded with the importance of addressing long-term structural funding issues to maintain a fit for purpose civil maritime capability appropriate to Australia’s interests. The two presentations taken together underscore the need to focus on how the Australian government is organized to address maritime security and defence issues. And I would argue that to use new technologies in this domain is also required fundamental organizational change as well. The featured graphic is from Jennifer Parker’s brief at the seminar and highlights the maritime supply chain, the security of which is beyond what one might consider is not covered easily by a focus on deterrence by denial.

It is with great sadness that we advise the passing of Errol (Mac) McCormack Air Marshal AO (Retd). Errol was born in Bundaberg in 1941 and commissioned as a RAAF pilot in 1963. He was assigned fast jet and completed tours in South East Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Borneo) on the F-86 Sabre, Vietnam on the Canberra bomber, US on the F-111A and US on the RF-4C Reconnaissance Phantom. Errol had a distinguished career in the RAAF, commanding at squadron, wing and Air Force levels and retired from the RAAF as Chief of Air Force in May 2001. After retiring he was a Board Member and consulted for many local and foreign companies dealing with Defence. AIRMSHL McCormack was the inaugural Chair of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation and was instrumental in founding the organisation. A service will be held for Errol at the ANZAC Memorial Chapel of St Paul, RMC Duntroon, on Monday 22 April at 1330h. In lieu of flowers, a donation to the Peter MacCallum Cancer Foundation in Errol's name would be appreciated - https://foundation.petermac.org/donate

Dr Robbin Laird, Multi-Domain Operations in the Maritime Domain: The Significance of Digital Interoperability, 16 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info The April 11, 2024 Williams Foundation Seminar focused on multi-domain operations in support of maritime security and defence. The progress made as the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been building a fifth generation enabled force needs to be continued in the years ahead. What is at stake is building an effective kill web enabled force which is built on a digital integration effort to allow the ADF to get best results from its deployed force in the operating area of significance. We have just seen a real-world example of what this means as the Iran attack on Israel was deflected by a kill web force of sensors and shooters spread across a coalition in support of the defence of Israel. I highlighted this future in a piece I wrote in 2012 and published in The Proceedings entitled the long reach of Aegis. That piece was focused on how F-35 integration with Aegis would yield significant results in defense capabilities. And when I visited the HMAS Hobart in Sydney Harbour, I was reminded how important a common combat system is for integration across a coalition and one’s ability to shape digital integration across a multi-domain force. After a visit to HMAS Hobart in 2018, this is what I wrote: The ship introduces a new level of combat capability into the Royal Australian Navy in which the ship’s reach is significantly greater than any previous ship operational in the Aussie fleet because of its Aegis Combat system. It is a key building block in shaping an integrated air-sea task force navy in that the capabilities onboard the ship can contribute to an integrated C2, ISR and strike grid in which the evolving capabilities of the ADF can cover a wider area of operation in the waters surrounding Australia or in service of missions further abroad. As Rear Admiral Mayer noted during an interview I conducted with him while he was Commander of the Australian fleet: “We are joint by necessity. “Unlike the US Navy, we do not have our own air force or our own army. Joint is not a theological choice, it’s an operational necessity.” What clearly this means is that the future of the Hobart class is working ways to operate in an integrated battlespace with land-based RAAF F-35s, Tritons and P-8s among other air assets. Their future is not protecting the carrier battle group, as the Aussies have no carrier. Rather, their future is “to provide air defence for accompanying ships in addition to land forces and infrastructure in coastal areas, and for self-protection against missiles and aircraft.” The skill sets being learned to operate the ship, notably the workflow on board the ship, in terms of the use of data, ISR and C2 systems, working situational awareness throughout the work stations onboard the ship, are foundational for other ships coming to the fleet. With the coming of the Brisbane, the HMAS Hobart will no longer be a single ship but the lead into a class of ships. And with the Australian decision with regard to its new frigates which will leverage the Aegis combat system capability as well, the HMAS Hobart has become the lead into a whole new approach to how the Australian fleet will shape its combat networks as well. The importance of continuing to build integratability across the fleet was emphasized at the seminar by Liam Catterson in his presentation. He is a former Royal Australian Naval officer who served on the Hobart and operated the Aegis combat system. He is now with Lockheed Martin Australia. In his presentation he highlighted the significance of the Aegis Combat System for fleet and ADF integrability with the U.S. Navy and Australia’s other core maritime allies, Japan and South Korea, all of whom operate Aegis and F-35s. Catterson underscored the following: It is important to note that the current fleet of three Hobart-class DDGs are interoperable with the Aegis equipped platforms of the USN, and other Aegis equipped coalition partners, such as the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force and the Republic of Korean Navy. This point was best illustrated through the first operational deployments within the Indo-pacific supporting 7th fleet activities, becoming a integral platform in the INDOPACOM theatre as opposed to previous deployments. This can be attributed in part to Aegis being as much a fighting philosophy as it is a Combat Management System, melding the concepts of a layered defensive posture, through depth of fire, sensor optimisation, autonomy and integrated fire control through Cooperative Engagement Capability. Without a CMS, a warship ceases to be that; no longer an instrument of deterrence. Without an interoperable CMS, a warship is a well-informed target and a potential hindrance to the joint force. This is a critical distinction when considering the acquisition of any future classes of surface combatants. The density of VLS cells in an Aegis destroyer is force projection however it is the Aegis Combat System that makes it a force multiplier. Slide from Catterson’s presentation to the Sir Richard Williams Seminar 11 April 2024. I had a chance to follow up with Catterson in a meeting at his office in Canberra on 15 April 2024. We discussed the way ahead with the digital backbone of a kill web force and the contribution of the common combat system built around Aegis for the Australian fleet and its integration with those of its allies in the region. We started by discussing how the Aegis combat system enabled significant interoperability across the allied forces in the Pacific. As Catterson noted: “One of the key things about the Aegis combat system operating across the Indo Pacific is that it provides a strong backbone of interconnectivity and interoperability from Australia all the way through the north through to Japan, and then across the Sea of Japan to the Republic of Korea as well. “The Aegis combat system provides a common language across the Indo Pacific fleets allowing for the for the fleets to deploy and operate together and to conduct combat operations in a coherent manner.” Liam Catterson attending the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar April 11, 2024. I then raised a key question. When one mentions the Aegis combat system at a seminar like we had at Williams, one might think that it is special pleading for a specific company, in this case Lockheed Martin. But over the years the combat system has changed dramatically and it is clearly the US Navy driving the development with Lockheed a close partners, but it is essentially a US Navy combat system today. Catterson provided an explanation of this development. “One of the strengths of Aegis is it was developed by the US Navy, and it has been a strong customer holding corporations to account to deliver what they wanted. Lockheed has been fortunate to be in lockstep with the US Navy, but it’s the US Navy driving these changes for it allows them to embark on the next generation of an integrated combat system for the fleet. This will enable them to operate as a system of systems to allow for interoperability, but also to enable cost effective and rapid roll out of developmental changes.” He closed with this thought which is very relevant to the future development of ADF multi-domain capabilities: “One of the strengths of the Aegis program is leveraging the operational experience from not only the U.S. but also other Aegis users as well. This allows for upgrading the fleet in a spiral development process. And this allows countries to remain in lockstep with each other. This means that integration costs are spread out over different partner nations in that manner.” Also, see the following: https://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/post/looking-back-and-looking-forward-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-integrated-networked-dr-robbin-laird https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/would-you-like-an-f-35-to-go-with-your-aegis/ https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-72/Article/577488/forging-a-21st-century-military-strategy-leveraging-challenges/ https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA498159.pdf

Dr Robbin Laird, What does a 21st century defence strategy look like for Australia in a multi-polar authoritarian world?, 16 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) The answer is that it does not look like the defence strategy which has been followed throughout most of the post-war period. The threat envelope is quite different. There is no American and Western managed rules-based order dominating the world. There are diverse authoritarian movements and states which follow their distinct interests but play off of one another. As one analyst has put it: “But the end of the Cold War has led to the atomisation of threats – many of these threat groups possess weapons and backing from powerful regional states that in some cases make them as capable as state-based actors. “Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East, where improved military capabilities are combined with an ideological zealotry that makes normal cost-benefit calculations underpinning deterrence redundant. This makes it very difficult for Washington to achieve the type of deterrence on which long-term regional stability is often based.” And the direct threat to Australia is broad and not narrowly focused on what the Australian Defence Force can do. A sustainable force and a resilient Australia are beyond the scope of narrowly considered defence investments in a ready force. They are all of government and all of society challenges. At the Williams Foundation Seminar held on April 11, 2024, the former Australian Secretary of Home Affairs, Mike Pezzullo, clearly underscored how different the era into which Australia and its allies had entered compared to the previous one. As he put it in his presentation: “What might this mean for Australia and specifically the Australian defence enterprise? Defence planning is rightly focused on a wide range of contingencies. With very little notice the Australian Defence Force could be called upon to undertake rapid deployments into the nearby arc of small states. While necessary and important, such ventures would only be marginally relevant to today’s great issues of war and peace. The same could be said of vital operations in support of distressed communities in the wake of natural disasters. “Given long lead times, defence also has to focus on complex capability and programming issues, especially as related to the planned force of 2035 and beyond.” But he cautioned that the threats in front of Australia now needed to drive a re-set in efforts that considered the engagement of the society in its own defence, not just crafting hypothetical future force structures. And he quite correctly warned against the danger of shaping Potemkin long range capabilities that may never arrive in time to make a difference. He focused much of his attention on the need to engage whole of government in working with economic leaders in shaping a way ahead for a more resilient Australia that could support a sustainable ADF along with core allies working with Australia as a strategic reserve both to deter and to prevail in crisis situations. Mike Pezzullo presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar on April 11, 2024. He underscored: “The most important question is whether a nation at large has the structures, capabilities and above all, the mindset and the will, that are required to fight and keep fighting to absorb, recover, endure and prevail. These cannot be put in place or engendered on the eve of the storm. “Now as a practical suggestion to focus relevant effort, we should consider modernizing the earlier practice from the 1930s and and then again from the 1950s of the preparation of a war book. The war book of those times were guides on what would need to be done and by whom, in the event of war. Preparing a new war book would help to focus the national mind.” He clarified his suggested approach as follows: “A new war book would deal with the entire span of civil defense and mobilization which would be required to move to a war footing, consisting of a range of coordinated plans. Some would deal with critical infrastructure protection, and national cyber defense. Other plans would deal with the mobilization of labour and industrial production covering supply chains, industrial materials, chemicals, minerals, and so on. “Sectoral plans would address the allocation, rationing and or stockpiling of fuel, energy, water, food, transport, shipping, aviation, communications, health services, pharmaceuticals, building construction resources, and so on and so forth. “They would also be plans for the protection of the civil population covering evacuation, rapid fortification and or shelter construction, and for augmenting police fire, rescue and ambulance capacities, and also dealing with social cohesion, border security, domestic security and public safety. “Lessons could be adapted from international experience, especially Ukraine and Israel, as well as from domestic experiences such as natural disasters, and the COVID pandemic noting however, that war is different.” In short, 21st century defence is not narrowly focused on the ADF and long range investments in a future force. All one has to look around you and find the activity of the multi-polar authoritarian world and the end of the American-led “rules-based order” to understand the future is now. How best to shape a way ahead in terms of augmented capabilities in short to mid-term and engage the nation in its own defence for the longer term is really the challenge.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Future is Now for the ADF: Shaping Space for Maritime Autonomous Systems, 15 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info During my current visit to Australia, both at the 11 April Williams Foundation Seminar and in my interviews and discussions, there is a clear concern for ramping up ADF capabilities now. In addition to any longer term additive capabilities, it is crucial in the evolving strategic context to find ways to enhance the ADF in the near to mid-term. This means finding ways to do so. Clearly one way to do so is in terms of building in operational space within the operating force for autonomous systems. In my recent book on the subject, I highlighted in detail how this can be done with the extant maritime autonomous systems to provide for mission threads or specific tasks. They are not replacing crewed or manned systems but they can be delegated specific ISR and C2 tasks, and with specific ways they can be weaponized to do specific missions correlated with capital assets. I had a chance to discuss this approach with Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett, who is not only the Williams Foundation board, but also on the Trusted Autonomous Systems Cooperative Research Centre board. As Chief of Navy, he launched the initial work on maritime autonomous systems and has seen initial systems coming to fruition. We discussed maritime autonomous systems and the way ahead with regard to the ADF. Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett highlighted: “The surface combatant review took an eye to considering autonomous systems but considered them a generation away. But the reality is that we are already down the autonomous systems path now. “It is wrong simply to focus on long range prospects for autonomous systems not yet here, such as platforms which could potentially carry a large number of weapons cells, rather than on the systems that are already here. The current systems can deliver significant ISR capability for example, and we need to integrate these systems into the operating force.” These systems are software and AI enabled and carry payloads. They are continuously upgraded and re-designed as they are used: they are not designed to a platform requirements standard. As Barrett underscored: “You have to embed them into the operating force to drive the demand for further fleet innovation. They are not an add-in to some future platform. “We need to use them actively to grow the force we need now in the threat environment we face now. We have done extensive experimentation in our Autonomous Warrior series of exercises but the future is now and we need to get on with it.” We then turned to a subject which I think highlights how you can enhance the ADF in the next three to five years with technology at hand. I wrote a study in 2020 on the new Offshore Patrol Vessel, which is a very flexible ship being built now. It is a platform designed to work with maritime autonomous systems. Given the absolute necessity to enhance maritime security in the northern waters of Australia, clearly the OPV in the hands of the Maritime Border Patrol plus autonomous systems is a way to go. And as ISR is enhanced for security purposes quite obviously that is a foundation for direct defense tasks as well. Not only could the OPV operate as a center for managing the deployed fleet of autonomous systems but it could refuel those who needed to as well. And the crew could swap out or repair payloads on the autonomous systems. Some will be remotely piloted and those could be done from the OPV; others will be truly autonomous and directed to their tasks. I asked Barrett about this opportunity which in my view is a low hanging fruit for ramping up ADF and Australian security and defence capabilities. The T-38 MARTAC Devil Ray T-38 Autonomous Maritime Vessel being refueled at sea by a USCG Cutter after coming to the ship by self-direction in 2023 in the 5th Fleet Area of Operations. Photo Credit: MARTAC According to Barrett: “It was the intention of the OPV to do exactly that. That is why the flight deck was retained. It was intended to compliment or supplement the hulls that are used for constabulary duty. It was to be a hull available to support the work of maritime remotes. “But we are still experimenting. We are addressing maritime autonomous systems as if they were legacy platforms with a generational life. “They simply are not like that. They carry payloads that are in a constant state of evolution. Their development needs to be rapid and in relation to the task at hand. They are mission thread defined: not platform defined. “They are outside of the normal long-cycle acquisition process. In fact, the challenge is that we are NOT organized to be able to use these systems now or to engage in the transformation process driven by maritime autonomous systems. “You cannot design a future force realistically if you are not engaged in the transformation of force through the use of maritime autonomous systems now.”

Dr Robbin Laird, Working the Sustainability Piece in Australian Defence: The Case of Munitions, 10 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info When shaping a relevant 21st century defence approach, sustainability is a key aspect of any credible effort. Gone are the days where just in time delivery from distant global supply chains is an effective means for deployed defense assets. Credible defense capability is built on a foundation of sustainability. The war in Ukraine has exposed the Achilles heel of Western defense, namely the lack of magazine depth. Munitions and weapons have been in perilously short supply. Digging into one’s war reserves to help the Ukrainians is short term necessity and folly. We collectively face the challenge of building a 21st century version of the arsenal of democracy, whereby allies build munitions in common and cross support one another in a crisis. Just having a single point of failure or having to wait for delivery from a global supply chain almost certainly to be disrupted is a strategic failure of the first order. If you are Australia, you face an especially difficult challenge as an island continent which is completely dependent in many areas on long global supply chains and a country in which manufacturing and self-processing of its rich natural resources has not been prioritized. Such a formula guarantees the absence of sustainable forces. This situation becomes even more significant when one looks at the most plausible allied engagement strategy, namely working with all of its Pacific allies to cross-support one another, and not simply focus on the United States. By enhancing its indigenous supply capabilities, Australia can also form a strategic reserve for allies in the region or forces that might operate from Australia in the future. But planning for such a future in the context of ongoing studies and briefing charts will not cut the cake. Briefing charts only kill the audience, not the enemy. So what can be done in the three to five year period do achieve something real and concrete? One answer is to build indigenous munitions capabilities, essentially a no-brainer from my point of view. If one looks at France, several years ago the government abolished the munitions facility established at the time of Louis XIV. Just in time was enough in our peaceful world. But with Macron focusing on the need for a war economy, the French have already rebuilt their munitions production capability and are proceeding apace. It is rather obvious that Australia needs to do the same on a priority basis. During my April 2024 visit to Australia, I had the chance to talk with a key munitions manufacturer, Robert Nioa about the challenge. He is head of the Nioa group which is described on their website as follows: NIOA is a privately-owned global munitions company. Established in Queensland, Australia in 1973, today the NIOA Group has strategic locations around the world. We are dedicated to the best practice supply and manufacture of firearms, weapons and munitions to Australian and allied nation defence forces, law enforcement agencies and commercial markets. My main question to him was could they work an effective strategy of sustainable munitions supply for Australia in the timeframe which I think is critical. According to Nioa: “Within a three-to-five-year window, we can enable Australia to provide the munitions required for an allied effort within the Indo Pacific region. We need dramatically expand our energetics production, and we can do that within that three-to-five-year window. “We don’t have enough production capacity in Australia currently to support what we need to do for ourselves, let alone to support allies in the Indo Pacific region. “But we can build factories within that timeframe to provide the explosives required to produce the kinetic enablers for the ADF and as we scale up for allies in the region. We can build a factory to make solid rocket motors. “We can build a factory to make the warheads. And then we can bring in technology for the guidance systems for long range strike or even expand conventional munitions production, everything from artillery munitions through to small arms production. It’s simply an allocation of funds and priorities.” The demand signal for such expanded sustainable capability is clearly there with the shortfalls exposed in the war in Ukraine. By Australia expanding capacity they can become a strategic reserve for allies in the region as well. And building such a sustainable infrastructure provides the material to enable lethal payloads in the future as new platforms and ways of delivering lethality evolve as well, such as I discuss in my latest book entitled The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems. One can get caught up in imagining weapons of the future and building planning scenarios: but if you don’t have the building blocks in place for effective force sustainability, it really will not matter when you face a determined adversary that has built a sustainable force. Photo: An Australian Army soldier from 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, fires the 84mm Carl Gustaf on 5th January 2024, Townsville Field Training Area, Queensland. Australian Army Soldiers from 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment conducted static live fire with the 84mm Carl Gustaf, engaging 450-metre targets at the Townville Field Training Area. The training aimed to build confidence in members when using the weapon system and qualify junior non-commissioned officers as a part of the Section Commander Battle Course (SCBC). 5 January 2024. Credit: Australian Department of Defence See also the following: https://www.eurosatory.com/en/ammunition-supply-the-growing-role-of-australias-nioa-group-on-the-international-stage/

Dr Robbin Laird, Multi-Domain Requirements of an Australian Maritime Strategy: The April 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar, 13 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info The first of two seminars of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in 2024 was held on 11 April 2024 at the National Gallery of Australia. The seminar was entitled, “The Multi-Domain Requirements of an Australian Maritime Strategy”, and the aim of the seminar was identified as follows: “To examine the enduring and emerging multi-domain requirements of an Australian maritime strategy in the context of the Defence Strategic Review. The Seminar examines the requirements through a Defence lens but will consider all national means that contribute to a maritime strategy and the need for coherence across concepts, doctrine, equipment, basing and preparedness. This strategic coherence is needed to synchronise effects across the Whole of Australian Government, Defence and industry, as well as international partners.” Last year’s DSR highlighted the ramped-up threat to Australia and the need to focus on the region, its partnerships and the need to build a more effective defence effort by Australia in the regional deterrence context. The focus of the government in its subsequent priorities has tended to focus on longer term acquisitions, first in terms of nuclear submarines through the AUKUS relationship and then for a new surface fleet in its recently released surface fleet review. A multi-domain operations discussion builds on the work of the Foundation during the time I have been writing the reports since 2014. The focus has been upon building a fifth-generation force, which after all revolves around sensor-shooter relationships built across an integrated force delivering multi-domain effects or what I prefer to call a kill-web enabled force. The focus is upon how you get full value out of your force now and to build out that extant force in the future to become more lethal and survivable. If you are focused on the fight tonight, which any credible combat force must focus on, then long range assets are projections of the possible, not augmentations of the credibility of the operational force. So any multi-domain discussion inevitably focuses on the way ahead for the force in being, rather than a force planning discussion of a projected future. When you add a specific target of what is that force in being operating in support of, inevitably gaps are identified, and the question then is how do you close the most significant gaps which threaten your security and defence interests. Such a focus is in turn raised if one raises the question of the means to the end of what one might consider a maritime threat envelope and strategy to deal with that envelope. In other words, one would expect the seminar discussion to focus more on the transition challenges of the ADF and the nation to deal with threat environment in the near to midterm rather than in 2040. That is what happened at the seminar in which speakers started by highlighting the importance of focusing on the here and now rather than on the force that might exist in 2035 or 2040. After the initial presentations focused on the current challenges and the role of the ADF and the nation to prepare to deal with them, the discussion shifted to whether Australia had a maritime strategy and if so what were the priorities of such a strategy. The majority of the presentations focused on specific services or industrial perspectives of how best to meet the multi-domain requirements for the evolving Australian defence challenge. But at the heart of the discussion was really the major challenge facing Australia: how to close defence gaps? How to engage the nation beyond the ADF in the broader defence challenges facing Australia? How to build a sustainable force? In later articles, I will provide detailed looks at the presentations and how the presenters dealt with these and other issues associated with the transition of the ADF. But here I am going to focus on the key issue of how does the ADF get more capable in the next three-to-five years and to do so in a way that is a prologue to the anticipated force transformation being designed? Peter Jennings was the first speaker and he underscored that the DSR had highlighted the near-term threats but was putting its money in forces a decade away. He put the challenge as follows: Governments can and do promise to spend unbelievable quantities of money on the future force but you only know what you get when you open the box. Not one cent of it buys deterrence today. From a deterrence perspective there is potentially some risk in promising strong deterrent capabilities in the future while maintaining the military capabilities of a skinned cat in the present day. That is the risk of pre-emption. Indeed, one reason why analysists are so worried about a mid- to late-2020s risk of conflict against Taiwan, or in the South China Sea, is that Xi Jinping may calculate that he faces a ‘use it or lose it’ choice with the PLA. Xi’s best chance of strategic success to achieve unchallenged military dominance in the Pacific are maximised by early action before his opponents’ next generation military capabilities are realised and while the democracies are internally distracted and divided. The tragedy is that there is so much which could be done with a bit of political and Defence push to strengthen ADF and national capabilities in the relative short term. For example: Ramping up domestic ammunition production and stockpiling. Establishing offensive drone capabilities on the basis of existing technology – not everything has to be quantum, AI, hypersonically joint and enabled. Funding some of the incredibly smart military capabilities that have been developed by Australian businesses. Researching some of the remarkable military and operational achievements which the Ukrainians (with allied help) and the Israelis have used in recent months. Here I’m not just talking about drones; but also optimising air defence capabilities; integrating intelligence and battlefield situational awareness; finding the right balance between exotic and more prosaic technology; working out how to get things in production in less than a decade. There is so much that could be done, so much so, in fact that our failure to do any of this makes me wonder if it is not the case that the government and Defence establishment is actually getting what it really wants? The second presentation was by Mike Pezzullo, the former Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs, who made an impassioned speech reminding the audience that building an effective defence structure is not simply the task of the ADF. The society needed to be engaged in shaping an Australia more capable of defending itself. You cannot outsource defence and security to an alliance or to the professional military for one needs to build a more resilient and sustainable Australian society and nation. Jennifer Parker of the National Security College (ANU) provided a comprehensive look at the maritime security challenges facing Australia and argued that in fact there was no strategy to deal with these comprehensive challenges. Her talk focused attention on what is the demand signal and what is the product needed to deal with that demand signal for maritime security and defence. Such an approach highlights what are the gaps to be met and how to meet them, which is quite different from force structure planning of an envisaged future force. Rather, one looks at demand drivers and what tools a nation has available to it, far beyond simply a professional military. The remaining presentations provided insights regarding how the ADF is changing to deal with the evolving challenges and I will take a detailed look at these presentations and focus on them in later articles. I will then return to the question of the match between the specific recommendations and the challenge of building an effective multi-domain force and sustainable society in dealing with the evolving threats and challenges.

Dr Robbin Laird, Managing Trade-Offs in Force Structure Development, 13 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) When a nation is facing a deteriorating threat environment, one key challenge in ramping up defence investments is how to balance enhancing the current fight to night force with new future platforms as part of a future force structure. This problem is compounded by the changing nature of the threat envelope for the liberal democracies. They now face a multi-polar authoritarian state and movement threat envelope whereby these states play off of one another and have various kinds of working relationships which fall short of a complete alliance, but together generate a diverse and diffuse threat to the liberal democracies. And when it comes to information war, they have a huge advantage of access to the social media-dominated world provide by liberal democratic systems compared to the face recognition controlled authoritarian regimes. But there is another challenge as well facing force structure design. The most dynamic new systems for innovation are software designed and AI enabled systems which simply do not follow the pattern of developing and procuring legacy platforms. If you don’t use maritime autonomous systems, for example, you cannot re-design them for you do so in direct relationship to their use. And as your current force becomes a hybrid one with the growing input from autonomous systems, what then is the nature of the future force which one designs based on legacy thinking? The challenge of the tension between dealing with growing threats now and delaying design responses much later was highlighted in Peter Jennings, Director of Strategic Analysis Australia, presentation to the recent Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar held on April 11, 2024. The main thrust of the presentation was Jennings perceiving a significant gap between the government’s emphasis on the near-term threat and its defence investments. The Australian government is not dealing with ways to enhance ADF capability in the near term but putting their priority investments into a future force. Jennings noted: Our worsening strategic outlook is a constant theme in Defence Minister Richard Marle’s speeches. Here is Mr Marles’ comments at the Sydney Institute on April 4: “Recorded military spending in the Indo-Pacific region has increased by almost 50 per cent in the past ten years, with China engaging in the biggest conventional military build-up in the world since the Second World War. “In the year 2000, China had six nuclear-powered submarines. By the end of this decade, they will have 21. In the year 2000, China had 57 major warships. By the end of this decade, they will have 200. “These investments are shifting the balance of military power in new and uncertain ways. We are in an environment where the risk of miscalculation increases, and the consequences are more severe. “And as China’s strategic and economic weight grows, it is seeking to shape the world around it. “For a country like Australia this represents a challenge.” In these comments Mr Marles is absolutely right. If you don’t understand that Australia is facing an increasingly threatening strategic environment, one where the risks of war in the mid-2020s is substantially growing, well, either you must be paying no attention to international developments, or you might conceivably be working in DFAT (Defence Foreign Affairs and Trade). But what has been the practical response according to Jennings? “The more our governments seem to talk about strategic risk, the less it seems that we are actually able to take practical steps to strengthen the ADF to present a deterrence to conflict.” In his presentation, he ends by highlighting the impact of investment in the autonomous systems technologies which Australia already has access to and has experimented with. Indeed, one of the great ironies is that Australian industry has contributed significantly to Ukrainian defence efforts in various forms of air and sea autonomous systems, but has not applied this technology to the operational ADF. Here is what Jennings emphasized: Australia really should engage in a crash program to field an array of drone technology relevant to the maritime domain. There is existing capability available – including Australian proprietary IP which we could bring into service this year or next. Imagine how motivating for Defence and industry it would be if the Government said there was a billion dollars available for the rapid development of TRL level 9 — System Proven and Ready for Full Commercial Deployment – drones. The challenge would be to have fielded capabilities in 2025, let’s say before the next federal election. Impossible I hear you cry? The Ukrainians are doing it every week. Our enemies – everyone from the PLA through to the other authoritarian powers, organised crime and the people smuggling cartels – these groups show themselves to me more agile and faster technology adopters than we are in Australia. We need to think fast and laterally about how to respond. By definition that means current policy processes in Defence are not well adapted to this task. Not fit for purpose as the DSR said. Hopefully this conference will be able to surface some new and creative ideas for Australian maritime strategy and that those ideas will get a fair hearing. I would note that a clear example of what Jennings is talking about is what is happening in the context of Nordic integration. And when one looks at recent Norwegian decisions to ramp up its defense budget and to spend it on programs already being built, one gets the idea of what is possible for a focus on enhancing the current force rather than pushing investment into a conceived of future force. Notably, several years ago the Norwegian Ministry of Defence worked with the German government on building common procurement of a German submarine. The Norwegians are putting forward more money to build out this program, rather than putting that money aside in a future design build. Jennings highlighted a crucial question: How do you ramp up ADF capabilities now? And I would add, how do you do so in a way that is a building block for your future force? It is not about putting money in a drain hole: it is about pump priming the process of improving your fight tonight capabilities and building towards a more capable future force.

Chris McInnes, Thinking CAP: air superiority and Australia’s defence, 10 December 2023 A misunderstanding of air power is distorting Australia’s defence discussion. The misunderstanding is the use of combat air patrols (CAP) over surface forces as a substitute for air superiority. CAP has its place but using it as a substitute for air superiority conflates presence with utility and ignores two key insights from history. First, securing enough air superiority in required times and places is a necessary precondition for broader air and surface operations and must take precedence in concepts and planning. Second, air superiority is best secured through concentrated and sustained campaigns of offensive actions, often far removed in time and space from surface operations. Addressing tough questions about Australia’s air superiority needs should be foremost among Australia’s defence considerations, not obscured by easier substitute questions like CAP radius. Air superiority allows friendly forces to use airspace or the surface below it without prohibitive interference from enemy air operations, including missiles. It is a relative and often temporary condition: enough air superiority to do what you want to do in a particular time and place for a given duration is sufficient. CAP is one among many options in the pursuit of air superiority. The present CAP confusion dates to at least this this 2013 article by Dr Andrew Davies, then of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). According to Davies the map below shows the approximate range to which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) ‘would be able to project force under the cover of our own airbases by having a standing fighter patrol or CAP overhead.’ The picture should be ‘compulsory reading for anyone contemplating ADF maritime power project projections’ because ‘unless they are relatively close to home, they’ll be done without persistent fixed wing air cover.’ Dr Marcus Hellyer echoed similar views (also while at the ASPI) in a 2019 series on the range of the F-35A (part 2, part 3, and part 4). Approximate ranges from Australian bases at which an F-35 JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] aircraft could remain on station for an hour. The inner line is for unrefueled aircraft. The outer line assumes an air-to-air refuelling at 500nm from base. (Source: ranges estimated from December 2009 Selected Acquisition report data.) Range rings for the Super Hornet with a weapons payload would be smaller. (Image and caption credit: Australian Strategic Policy Institute) Davies and Hellyer are first-rate analysts, but they have this wrong on two counts. The errors are conflating air power’s utility with its ability to remain on-station over a location, and the consequent use of CAP radius as a proxy for effective range. This bait and switch – doubtless unintended – lures analysts with a ready answer to an easy question about CAP radius but means they avoid thinking through tough questions about air superiority. In this example drawing on Hellyer’s work, the F-35A’s CAP radius is treated as a frontline in the sky behind which Australia is assumed to hold air superiority. This is a dangerous over-simplification to put it mildly. More recently a series on the future of the Royal Australian Navy cited Davies to illustrate Australia-based air power’s limited ability to support surface operations. According to the authors, this is a ‘major weakness’ because ‘naval operations in a hostile environment require continuous airborne early warning support and in situ or immediately on-call combat air support.’ The flaw here is insisting on the presence of aircraft without articulating the purpose of that presence. If it is true that Australia’s warships will need aircraft continually overhead to survive in hostile environments, we need to rethink our operational concepts and investment plans. On-call air power has always been attractive to surface forces because it is reassuring and responsive. It is expensive but doable in permissive environments and has enhanced Western militaries’ operating style since the Second World War. During Operation Okra Australian F/A-18 provided near-instantaneous reconnaissance and firepower to friendly forces for three to four hours or more in northern Iraq and Syria, more than 1,000nm from the aircraft’s base. The 90 percent survival rate of Western troops suffering traumatic injuries in recent conflicts owes much to rapid and assured aeromedical evacuation. But all this air support has depended on earlier air superiority campaigns, however brief or far removed in time and space they may have been. For the first time since the Second World War, Australia cannot assume air superiority in its region due to the Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing air strength. Attempting to maintain CAP, and other forms of on-call air support, without sufficient air superiority is a short route to disaster. It ‘penny packets’ air power and puts it on the back foot, allowing enemies to concentrate and overwhelm thinly spread forces at the time and place of their choosing. Friendly air power is concurrently prevented from concentrating and is rapidly exhausted and bled dry. We should hope the PLA works this way. We know this because surface commanders repeatedly insisted air power be used this way during the Second World War, the last major conflict to see sustained struggles for air superiority. The approach failed every time, accelerating defeat for air and surface forces. Despite comparable numbers and technical capabilities, thinly spread Anglo-French air umbrellas were swept aside by concentrated German air power in 1940. Similar outcomes befell the Soviets in 1941 and the Americans in Tunisia in early 1943. The Western allies eventually recognised winning air superiority had to come first. Fighting for control of the air became the sine qua non and prime campaign for air forces with the full endorsement of their joint counterparts. As Dwight Eisenhower, a US Army general and supreme Allied commander in Europe, recounted in his memoirs ‘no great victory is possible without air superiority.’ The most effective methods for gaining air superiority were concentrated and sustained campaigns of typically offensive tactical actions targeting enemy forces in the air and on the ground. Air superiority was an outcome of many small independent actions by all instruments of power, often far from surface operations in time and space. It was rarely absolute and sustaining air superiority required continuous effort. B-17 Flying Fortresses and escorting fighters of the United States 8th Army Air Force leave contrails during a mission over Germany. (Image credit: Roger Freeman Collection, American Air Museum in Britain) Operation Pointblank, the Anglo-American campaign for air superiority over Western Europe in the lead-up to the Normandy invasion in June 1944, was the largest and longest such effort. From mid-1943, increasingly powerful bomber forces prioritised the destruction of Germany’s aircraft industry. The introduction of American long-range fighter escorts in late-1943 was important but constrained by defensive tactics that prioritised protecting bombers. A shift to more offensive tactics that emphasised destroying German fighters in the air and on the ground unleashed their potential. Offensive tactics were also important in defensive settings like Australia’s contemporary context. During the Battle of Britain in 1940, a sophisticated early warning and control system allowed British fighter aircraft to focus their efforts and fight offensively. Exhausting standing patrols were minimised as fighters could remain on the ground until German raids were detected. When launched, fighters were directed efficiently with time and awareness to gain advantage through altitude and approach angles. The British also attacked German airfields throughout the battle to disrupt attacks before they were launched. Just as important as the targeting and tactics was the Anglo-American air forces’ emphasis on training, maintenance, and welfare to build pressure on their opponents through continuous operations. This contrasted with the German (and Japanese) approach and proved a key advantage in the struggles for air superiority. Pointblank climaxed in February 1944 when thousands of American and British bombers struck aircraft production facilities on six consecutive days while their fighter escorts hunted at will. The Germans lost 2,605 aircraft in February 1944; more than half were non-combat losses as relentless pressure shattered Germany’s air power systems. Air superiority for the Normandy landings (and incidentally for Soviet forces in Russia) was won in distant skies over many months. Allied air power was then free to attack German defences throughout Western Europe and make ‘daylight movement virtually impossible throughout most of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.’ On D-Day itself Allied aircraft flew more than 20,000 sorties to drop airborne divisions, deliver firepower, and continually observe. The 200 German sorties over Normandy on 6 June 1944 serve as a reminder air superiority is rarely absolute. This pattern repeated wherever Western forces operated in the war and since. During the Cold War, improvements in surface-to-air defences drove the development of sophisticated techniques to suppress or destroy them. In 1991, the West’s Cold War air forces smashed Iraq’s air defences to seize air superiority in ‘the earliest hours – even minutes – of combat’  of Operation Desert Storm. The largest single air campaign since the Second World War then shattered Iraqi ground forces, allowing friendly troops to sweep aside the world’s fourth largest army in just 100 hours and with minimal casualties. Air superiority has since come so swiftly and easily as to be taken for granted by Western forces. Its physical and conceptual foundations have consequently atrophied. After decades of distraction, the United States Air Force has re-emphasised air superiority in the face of China’s growing power. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has laid bare alarming deficiencies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s European air forces while reinforcing the criticality of air superiority for all forces. The complacency has also reached the Royal Australian Air Force and the ADF. Australia’s limited public discussion on the topic has focused on technical evaluations of investment options rather than air superiority’s role in Australia’s defence. The last time Australia’s Air Power Manual explicitly identified the primacy of air superiority was in 1998. Later editions have diluted this clarity and air superiority has gone from the prime campaign to just another ‘contribution.’ It is little wonder muddled thinking like using CAP as a substitute for air superiority has emerged. Australian air power’s ability to CAP at a given place is a secondary consideration to questions like when, where, and to what degree and duration is air superiority needed for the ADF to operate in the region. These questions may, as Andrew Davies argues, raise unsettling doubts about the viability of some surface operations in contested environments, but they need to be asked – and first. From there, the discussion can turn to the best ways for Australia to win enough air superiority where and when needed. CAP will be an option, but down the list. It is certainly no substitute for air superiority. Chris McInnes is a historian and researcher specialising in air power. He is a former air force officer now in the private sector.