Search Results

Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self Reliance National Gallery of Australia 11 April 2019 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self-Reliance, May 2019 Download pdf Synopsis and Program Download pdf Handbook Download pdf Presentations Dr Alan Stephens OAM, University of NSW, Canberra Defence self-reliance and plan B - Paper Download pdf Dr Andrew Carr, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University Defence self-reliance in Australian foreign policy: why and so what? No presentation Prof Brendan Sargeant, Australian Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific Defence policy in flux No presentation LTCOL David Beaumont, School of Logistics Operations Australian Army From tail to tooth: sustaining a self-reliant ADF Note: this presentation is the personal work of LTCOL Beaumont Download pdf Donna Cain-Riva, Future Logistics Capability – Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force Far from sanctuaries: sustaining a fifth-generation fight in the Indo-Pacific Download pdf LTCOL Keirin Joyce, Army Unmanned Aerial Systems Army Headquarters Alternative sustainment: Army’s approach to drones Download pdf WGCDR Alison MacCarthy, Heavy Airlift Systems Program Office, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Platform stewardship: a CASG perspective Download pdf Chris Stevens, Air Domain MBDA The UK Weapons Portfolio – successfully providing freedom of action and operational advantage Presentation - Email request to info@williamsfoundation.org.au Jerome Dunn, Counter Hypersonics, Northrop Grumman Countering hypersonics and self-reliance through architecture design Presentation - Email request to info@williamsfoundation.org.au Background Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. In doing so they have, among other things, highlighted the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity operations involving peer competitors. Within this context, the seminar in August 2018 focused on the importance of a joint approach to building an independent and potent regional strike capability. The topic broadened to begin an examination of new ways and means of enhancing sovereign options as part of an evolving deterrent strategy. The August seminar began a process of looking at the evolution of Australian defence capabilities through an increasingly sovereign lens and concluded there are some important choices to be made if we are to maintain our capability edge and influence in the region. Allies are crucial to the Australian concept of defence; however, the emerging strategic circumstances demand it is vital we reconsider the ways and means of enhancing Australian sovereignty to better contribute to our relationships and ensure a more sophisticated and independent defence of Australian interests. During the 2019 seminars, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation will develop this theme and address more broadly the question of how to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. Aim of the Seminar The first seminar will examine the question from an historical standpoint and focus on the importance and challenges of sustaining an Australian Defence Force that can autonomously contribute to the pursuit of Australia’s national interests in an increasingly challenging environment. A key element of our thinking is to focus on the importance of our natural strategic strengths and reconsider Australian territory and geography, as well as the near region, as an integral part of our deterrence posture. This entails building the infrastructure and partnerships necessary to enable more effective mobility so that Australian and partner territory can be used as a chessboard on which we are able to move Australian forces, and upon which allied forces could operate in times of crisis as part of a broader coalition engagement and sustainment strategy. Enhanced Australian industrial sovereignty and sustainability is a core requirement of a secure and sustained force in times of crisis, where the normal functioning of the global supply chain will be deliberately targeted and disrupted. This will require an integrated strategy for preparedness, operations and sustainment of the force enabled by appropriate industry policy to ensure the delivery of a sovereign defence capability. Seminar Outline This industrial policy must be closely aligned with defence policy, concepts and doctrine and will require a new approach and attitude to partnerships and an increased emphasis on the combat support and combat service support functions of the fifth-generation force. This will further develop the Australian manoeuvre approach to warfighting but set in a much broader context than simply the force elements. The seminar will address the evolving Australian approach to building new capabilities and systems with an expanded role for Australian industry as part of a broader alliance structure. A contemporary example is how Army is building its unmanned aircraft capability through an innovative partnering strategy with industry. Similarly, the seminar will address how Defence can be a better steward of its major platforms by partnering with industry. One such sector worthy of consideration by Australia is in emerging technologies and how these might disrupt traditional concepts of supply chains and enhance Australia’s sovereign capabilities. The development of an Australian-based research, design, manufacture, test and sustainment capability is a realistic aspiration and provides sovereign capability which contributes significantly within a broader alliance structure. In particular, Australia can play a significant role in the development and production of 21st century missiles and at the same time support the needs of core allies who could leverage evolving Australian science and technology, test and experimentation ranges, and advanced manufacturing capabilities within a sophisticated and diverse global supply chain. Above all, this will add diversity, complexity and resilience to the Australian defence and security posture and provide additional choice in the selection of the most appropriate ways and means of delivering a balanced suite of defensive and offensive independent strike capabilities. Download pdf

The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre National Gallery of Australia 24 October 2019 Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Requirements for 5th Generation Manoeuvre Warfare, November 2019 Download pdf Synopsis and Program Download pdf Handbook Download pdf Presentations WGCDR Jo Brick, Australian War College The Manoeuvrist Approach - a historical perspective Download pdf AIRCDRE Phil Gordon, Commander Air Warfare Centre The Changing Character of Manoeuvre Download pdf Prof Brendan Sargeant, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Assured Access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific No slide presentation Michael Shoebridge, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Implications for Force Design No slide presentation RADM Lee Goddard CSC, RAN, Commander Maritime Border Command Achieving multi-agency situational understanding Download pdf Richard Czumak, Lockheed Martin Australia Multi-Domain Command and Control and the Role of Autonomy Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, OAM, Chief Information Officer Group Network requirements for Fifth Generation Manoeuvre Download pdf AIRMSHL Mel Hupfeld AO DSC, Chief of Air Force Fifth Generation Command and Control No slide presentation BRIG Ian Langford DSC and Bars, Head Land Capability Land Forces in 5th Generation Manoeuvre Download pdf Hugh Webster, Boeing Defence Australia Next-Gen integrated force: what’s really stopping us? No slide presentation MAJGEN Tony Fraser AO, CSC (Retd), Deputy Secretary, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Establishing the Defence and Industry Partnerships for Fifth Generation Manoeuvre Download pdf AVM Chris Deeble AO, CSC (Retd), Northrop Grumman Industry perspective Download pdf Background Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force. Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which that integrated force will prepare and operate. In doing so they have, among other things, highlighted the challenges of making the strategic shift from counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to higher tempo and higher intensity Joint operations involving peer competitors. Within this context, the 2019/20 seminars will further develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. In doing so, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation will continue to look at the evolution of the Australian Defence Force from the perspective of the sovereign lens and setting the conditions for future success. The seminar in October 2019 is titled ‘The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre’ and will examine the differences and potential gaps in how the Australian Defence Force must equip and organise for multi-domain operations. In April 2020, we will expand on the theme and focus on ‘Preparedness for Fifth Generation Manoeuvre’. This seminar will explore the readiness, training and sustainment activities necessary to prepare for a broad range of possible contingencies in support of national security objectives, which might involve acting independently in the broader region. Seminar Outline Building upon the existing foundations of Australian Defence Force manoeuvre capability, the aim of the October seminar is to explore the differences in character and attributes of fifth generation manoeuvre and identify potential gaps in the way we must think, equip and organise to meet emerging national security outcomes. The seminar will consider manoeuvre from a historical perspective and evolve the concept to the emerging policy and requirements of contemporary operations, especially as they relate to power projection and the emergence of the electromagnetic spectrum as a warfighting domain in its own right. It will examine how we sense, make sense, and decide within the emerging operational environment and highlight the increasingly sophisticated and integrated relationship between the human and technology and the trusted autonomous systems which will characterise fifth generation operations. The seminar will further examine the enduring requirement for situational awareness as a prerequisite for operational success, and the challenges of developing a broader understanding of the environment and communicating command intent to enable manoeuvre, especially when the electromagnetic spectrum is both contested and congested. Multi-domain command and control will be a critical enabler for fifth generation manoeuvre with communication and network resilience a fundamental consideration in force design and employment. The seminar will also highlight the ongoing need to inculcate a fifth generation mindset into combat support and combat service support functions to better exploit the advantages of greater access and movement of information as well as the traditional physical enablers of manoeuvre. It will consider the role of critical infrastructure and geography and the opportunities and risks associated with the Australian operating environment. The Sir Richard Williams Foundation has identified pre-eminent speakers from across the Australian and international defence communities, as well as inviting industry representatives to reflect the integral role they will play in the national framework of future operational capability.

Brian Weston 'On Target: Similarities from 1925' in Australian Defence Business Review , September-October 2019 p 80 In the On Target column of the July/August Australian Defence Business Review, Alan Stephens concluded the three-part series on Sir Richard Williams by outlining Williams’ concept of operations for the defence of Australia ‒ a document of sixty-eight pages titled a “Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia”. Some of the themes Williams identified in his concept of operations, drafted in 1925, bear similarities to Australia’s circumstances of today. The first was the importance of Australia’s geo-strategic setting. Williams placed emphasis on Australia’s proximity to South-east Asia and of the importance of Australia’s north and north-eastern maritime approaches, and their island chains, to the defence of Australia. As Alan Stephens noted in his column, it was not until 1987 that Australia’s geo-strategic setting was again so clearly identified, by Paul Dibb, as a critical policy determinant in Australian defence policy. No doubt, Williams would have endorsed the geo-strategic perspective evident from the Azimuthal Equidistant Projection attached to the inside rear cover of the Department of Defence policy paper Defence of Australia – 1987, some 62 years after Williams’ 1925 memorandum. The second similarity was of the expanding influence of an emerging Asian power. In Williams’ day it was Japan building on its early military success in defeating the Russian Baltic fleet at the Battle of Tsushima Strait in 1905, with covetous eyes on neighbouring lands. An aggressive strategic aspiration later formalised under the innocuous label of Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. But while some recognised Japan as an emerging threat, it was not a universally accepted view even after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. In 1934, Australia’s leading industrialist, Essington Lewis, visited Japan. He returned to Australia surprised at Japan’s industrial capacity. He had also been unsettled by the menace and aggression evident within Japan. He reported in those terms to the Australian government and while his reporting stimulated an increased awareness of the threat Japan posed, history records the actions taken by the Australian government were far short of what was warranted. Today the emerging Asian power is the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a totalitarian state under the governance of the Communist Party of China, with aspirations as both a global and regional power; as evidenced by its occupation and militarisation of the South China Sea in defiance of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Some commentators seem to place little weight on this occupation and militarisation, preferring to draw solace from China’s role as one of the world’s major trading economies, somewhat akin to how some dismissed the events which took place in the Tsushima Strait in 1905. As for national governance, while the detail of Japan’s then militaristic autocracy is different from that of today’s PRC, in both instances the then Japan and today’s PRC were and are one-party states; well-able to plan and take decisions that nations with a democratic form of government cannot. Add to this, the soft power being acquired and projected by the PRC and of its disregard for established conventions in such matters as the acquisition of technology, and it would seem there is little to hold back coercion as a means of advancing PRC national interests. Third, Williams was concerned that the scope and utility of a new military capability ‒ air power ‒ was generally neither understood nor recognised, and he went on to articulate a concept of operations advocating the emerging capabilities of aircraft in Australia’s national security policy. At the time, his concept of operations was given little credence but once World War II broke out, it was clear advances in aeronautic technologies had revolutionised military operations. Today, there is a plethora of advancing technologies, many with scope for military application, such as autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence, intercontinental strike, space and cyber, which, when taken together with soft-power such as “debt-bombs” and social media, will have a significant impact on military operations. But more importantly, these developments open the door to new strategies and to new ways a nation state, or non-state actor, can influence, intimidate, control or prosecute an aggressive campaign against other nations. While the term “asymmetric warfare” has long been in the politico-military lexicon, that lexicon is currently under revision as, new chapters about new ways of prosecuting aggressive campaigns against nation states are being added. While hopefully the net effect of these changes may be to lower the risk of large-scale war between nations due the grave risks involved in twenty-first century conflicts, they do substantially increase the likelihood of smaller-scale aggressive and coercive campaigns to advance a nation’s national interests. Australia would be well-wise to understand the world’s post-1945 system of established “rules-based international order” is being superseded. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: A Message from Beijing?' in Australian Defence Business Review , November-December 2019 p 74 The On Target column of the September/October Australian Aviation concluded with some observations from the concept of operations for the defence of Australia drafted by Sir Richard Williams in 1925 ‒ a document of sixty-eight pages titled a “Memorandum Regarding the Air Defence of Australia” ‒ and the similarity of some of Williams’ observations with the strategic scenario that is emerging in the Indo-Pacific today. In particular, the September/October On Target column noted there were some parallels between the emerging notion of “air power” in 1925 and the term “asymmetric warfare” today. The column also noted that today, new ways of prosecuting aggressive campaigns against nation states are emerging, and that some of these developments might increase the likelihood of smaller-scale aggressive and coercive campaigns aimed at advancing a nation’s national interests. The column concluded with the observation that Australia would be wise to understand the world’s post-1945 system of “rules-based international order” is being superseded. By co-incidence, as that article appeared in print, China, on 1 October, chose to live-stream to the world an impressive array of emerging military capabilities. But curiously, while 1 October is China’s National Day, the activities of 1st October 2019 had little to do with some four millennia of China’s history instead focussing solely on a celebration of the 70 years of rule by the Communist Party of China ‒ the period following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October, 1949 during the closing years of the Chinese Civil War. While such a celebration by a totalitarian state under one-party, autocratic rule might be seen as somewhat self-indulgent, when combined with the demonstration of an array of new, emerging and impressive military capabilities, it takes on a more sombre and intimidating messaging. Prominent among the military hardware displayed were 16 road-mobile, launchers for the DF-41 inter-continental ballistic missile, suggesting that China ‒ a nuclear power ‒ was continuing to mature and expand its recently developed inter-continental strike capability. But perhaps even more significant was the display of the DF-17 surface-to-surface hypersonic glide missile. The hypersonic glide missile provides greater range and accuracy, with the manoeuvring terminal capability posing significant challenges for anti-missile defence systems. Although considered not yet operational, the DF-17 suggests sizeable leaps have been made in China’s military technology and that China is advancing towards developing an accurate, conventionally armed, long-range, surface-to-surface missile capability. Also, on display were an unmanned supersonic rocket-powered reconnaissance vehicle, an unmanned attack aircraft prototype (the Loong 2 medium altitude unmanned system), and the YJ-18 anti-ship missile with its supersonic terminal dash capability. All told, these advances in military capability in a relatively short timeframe, have not just increased China’s military combat power but have dramatically increased the strategic reach of China’s military power. The pace of these developments also suggests that China’s military capabilities will continue to advance in capability and reach. Apart from the range of military capabilities on display, perhaps even more concerning was the sustained media focus on China’s leader, Xi Jinping, who now concurrently occupies the following powerful appointments: General Secretary of the Communist Party of China; Chairman of the Central Military Commission (Commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army); President of the People's Republic of China; and Chairman of the National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China. Additionally Xi Jinping was designated as China’s Paramount Leader in 2012; and in 2018, Xi Jinping removed the presidential term limits which previously limited the duration of occupancy of previous appointees to the office of President of the People's Republic of China. Xi Jinping is without doubt, the most powerful ruler of the People's Republic of China since Mao Zedong ‒ and the National Day parade of 1 October, certainly reinforced that observation. When combined with other observations, such as: the People’s Republic of China is a one party totalitarian state under the governance of the Communist Party of China; China has already demonstrated its aspirations towards enhancing its regional power and global reach, as evidenced by its occupation and militarisation of the South China Sea in defiance of a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration; China has not been backward in using its growing wealth and soft power to advance its national interests; and China has long indulged in the illegal gathering and pirating of new technologies, intellectual property, source code, etc from anywhere on the globe; then regional neighbours and international interlocutors need to comprehend that in dealing with China, they cannot expect China to conform with the established “rules-based” international protocols that have existed since the end of World War II ‒ China has consigned those protocols to the history books. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and On Target is published as a regular column in the Australian Defence Business Review. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: Australia's First Island Chain: Part 1' Australian Defence Business Review January-February 2020 pp72-73 A continuing theme in Chinese strategic thinking is the concept of “island chains” with the First Island Chain stretching from the Kuril Islands of Southern Japan, through the Northern archipelago of the Philippines, to northern Borneo. A Second Island Chain extending through the Marianas, including Guam, lies beyond the First Island Chain with a Third Island Chain in the central Pacific. Of these three chains it is the First Island Chain ‒ which includes Taiwan ‒ that is of prime economic, strategic, military and geo-political significance to China. With many archipelagos lying to the north of Australia, the concept of island chains might also have application to Australian strategic thinking. Certainly, the first Chief of the Air Staff of the RAAF, Sir Richard Williams, showed keen interest in the archipelagos to the north of Australia and, in 1926, he conducted an extensive familiarisation flight up the east coast of Australia, through Papua, New Guinea and on to Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Williams departed Point Cook on 25 September 1926 in a de Havilland DH50, a civilianised version of the DH9 bomber with an enclosed cabin for four passengers, with the pilot seated in an open cockpit at the rear of the cabin. The biplane, powered by a single Siddeley Puma water-cooled engine, was fitted with metal floats. On the flight, Williams was accompanied by Flight Lieutenant McIntyre, pilot and Corporal Trist, mechanic. The DH50 returned to Point Cook on 7 December, having flown some 10,000 miles, visited 23 localities outside of mainland Australia, and logged 126 flight hours ‒ an aviation feat not only of considerable historical significance to Australia but also, a flight of great value to Williams in his role as Chief of the Air Staff. More significantly, Williams’ ten weeks in a DH50 floatplane was further evidence that he had already turned his mind to the implications of the disposition of the archipelagos to the north of Australia, in how to defend Australia from emerging threats. The flight was a pragmatic way of investigating how the evolving capabilities of the aeroplane could exploit the archipelagic disposition to the betterment of Australia’s defence. Today, and given the recent surge in Australia’s interest in its South Pacific neighbours, is the concept of “island chains” of relevance to Australian strategic thought? Certainly, the geography of the archipelagos remains unchanged although a new strategic and geo-political framework has evolved, having replaced the sub-servient colonies of former colonial powers. But also, Australia’s regional interests are now Indo-Pacific in nature; hence, a twenty-first century concept of “Australia’s First Island Chain” should be more appropriately defined as stretching from Sri Lanka; along the Indonesian archipelago from Sumatra and Java to Irian Jaya; through Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands; and on to Vanuatu and Fiji. From a strategic perspective, that extensive region from mainland Australia and its island territories to the southern shores of “Australia’s First Island Chain” might be described, in academe strategic terms, as “Australia’s Sphere of Influence”. Or, from a national security perspective the region might be described, in pragmatic sporting terms, as “Australia’s Red Zone”, with the consequential theatre of military operations being predominantly maritime. Significantly, military operations within this area play to Australia’s strengths of high levels of professional military mastery and an aptitude for the exploitation of technologically advanced capabilities; with Australia’s continuing investment in surveillance, reconnaissance, information and intelligence capabilities key to the successful conduct of sub-surface, surface and above-surface maritime operations. So, although this theatre of operations is vast ‒ and provided government continues to grow defence funding to 2% of GDP ‒ and then a little more to fund some capability augmentation, Australia’s defence forces can be expected to operate with military credibility throughout this “Red Zone”. On the other hand, operations into and beyond Australia’s First Island Chain will involve other nation states and their sovereign territories. They also come with difficult island and littoral geography and, almost certainly, will require access to forward basing and will need to be undertaken with the support of allies ‒ together with a Pandora’s box of strategic, geo-political and operational scenarios which complicate and hinder both conceptual force structure planning and operational contingency planning. In contrast, the notion of Australia’s First Island Chain brings a clearer conceptual basis for force development and operational planning, a lesser dependence on the complexities and national interests of partners and allies and yet, the region remains of critical relevance to Australia’s security. So, is Australia capitalising on these realities by devoting enough effort to the detail of how Australia can defend and dominate the nation’s “Red Zone”? Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target was published regular column was published in Australian Aviation magazine. January-February 2020 Download pdf

Dr Robbin Laird, The Coming of the Australian Arafura Class Offshore Patrol Vessel: A Case Study of Building a New Platform for the Australian Fifth Generation Force, The Williams Foundation, April 2020 Introduction The Arafura Class Offshore Patrol Vessel is the first of the new build platforms. It provides the template with regard to the entire reset of how the Australians are seeking to build out their integrated distributed force. The contours of the new template are in place and can be identified and this report provides an initial identification and assessment of the new approach. The new build OPV is not just a new platform; it is the spearhead of a new approach. And that approach as well as the OPV template is the focus of this report. The Williams Foundation research fellow, Dr Robbin Laird, has opened the aperture on the debate around an integrated 5th generation ADF with an insightful examination into the development of the Navy’s new Offshore Patrol Vessel. Conceived not simply as a replacement platform but as an adaptable and integrated capability within a joint force, Dr Laird presents the OPV program as a model for future capability development. This report compliments his previous work on 5th Generation air power Concepts within the ADF. VADM Tim Barrett AO, CSC, RAN (Retd), Former Chief of Navy and Williams Foundation Director Download Pdf E-book version Second Line of Defense website

Brian Weston 'On Target 'Function over Geography: Combat Power through Organisation – Part 3' in Australian Aviation December 2017 p.20 The On Target columns in the October and November issues of Australian Aviation outlined the evolution of RAAF organisational policy up to 1986, with the observation that although the RAAF proclaimed to organise itself on a functional basis, that organizational functionality was disrupted by the reality that “RAAF Formation Officers Commanding” were, in reality, geographically limited “RAAF Base Officers Commanding”. As a consequence, the command of RAAF operational units was fragmented, especially when like-roled units were not co-located. For instance, when Mirage squadrons were resident at Williamtown, Butterworth and Darwin, the three squadrons reported through different command chains ‒ through their respective Base Officers Commanding at Williamtown, Butterworth and Darwin. Similarly, the RAAF air support squadrons of Chinook, Iroquois and Caribou were spread across Fairbairn, Richmond, Amberley and Townsville with command chains through four different Base Officers Commanding. These command arrangements meant there was no single appointment responsible for the oversight of either the tactical fighter force or the tactical transport force, until the various command chains came together at the level of the Air Officer Commanding, Operational Command. This was a serious organisational deficiency and it took some years to carry the argument that “unity of command” over all the assets of a specific air capability was more important than “unity of command” over all the units located on a particular RAAF base. After some years of discussion, especially at the tactical and operational levels, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal “Jake” Newham decided to transition the air force to a fully functional operational organization when he decided that RAAF operational units would be organised into “Force Element Groups” (FEGs). Newham, with his strong operational background, including tours as Staff Officer Operations and Senior Air Staff Officer at Operational Command, was well placed to decide this issue although initially he introduced the new arrangements with effect 2 February 1987, on a “trial basis”, to give time to win over some doubters. But it was obvious there would be no going back, and Air Force Organisational Directive 6/88 of 1 June 1988 formalised the new FEG arrangements. In brief, “like” operational units would be grouped together under one commander. For the fighter capability, all fighter units together with the operational fighter training units were grouped into the Tactical Fighter Group (TFG). And, with air defence and air superiority operations being dependent on air surveillance and fighter direction, the supporting air surveillance/direction units of the Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) were also included in the TFG. OC RAAF Williamtown became CDR TFG, commanding units located at Williamtown, Tindal, Darwin, Amberley and Pearce. The Strike Reconnaissance Group (SRG) incorporated the strike reconnaissance F-111C squadrons, together with F-111C operational training. The Maritime Patrol Group (MPG) incorporated the maritime P-3C Orion squadrons together with the P-3C operational training units. OC RAAF Amberley and OC RAAF Edinburgh became CDR SRG and CDR MPG respectively. OC RAAF Richmond became CDR Air Lift Group (ALG) retaining authority over the Richmond-based C-130 and B707 units and gaining the Fairbairn-based VIP squadron, while losing command of the Richmond-based Caribou tactical transport squadron. Critical to the 24/7 operations of the ALG, was the Air Movement Coordination Centre and the RAAF high frequency radio network through which command and control of deployed air lift and maritime patrol aircraft was maintained. A significant change was the establishment of the Tactical Transport Group (TTG) comprising the Iroquois/Black Hawk, Chinook and Caribou squadrons, resident at Fairbairn, Richmond, Amberley and Townsville. In hindsight, as all these units were in the business of “air support”, especially air support of the army, the TTG might have been better titled the Air Support Group, with its command elevated to an officer of air commodore rank rather than a group captain. Both measures would have better emphasized the importance the RAAF placed on air support operations. The FEG commanders also gained command over the operational/intermediate level maintenance units, such as the 400 series maintenance wings which supported each FEG. The reorganization also resolved the ambiguity about the authority of the (Base) Air Staff Officer by abolishing the appointment, and returning to the practice of grouping squadrons into wings under the command of Officers Commanding, generally of group captain rank. Two of these wings, No 81 Wing (F/A-18A) and No 82 Wing (F-111C), were also given roles as deployable tactical headquarters which provided the air force with options for the command and control of deployed air operations. The 1987/1988 FEG reorganization ‒ heralded by the formation of No 1 Operational Group in 1943 ‒ was a seminal event in RAAF history; and, while the FEGs have since been periodically reshaped as the capabilities of the air force evolved, the air force became a more capable combat force because of its more focused, accountable and effective operational organisation. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target 'Evolving the Force Element Group: Combat Power through Organisation – Part 4' in Australian Aviation January-February 2017 p.2 The three previous On Target columns in Australian Aviation have outlined the evolution of RAAF organisational policy to the period when the RAAF formalised the organisation of its operational units into Force Element Groups (FEGs) on 1 June 1988. The new FEGs were the Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), which included the supporting air direction units of the Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE), the Strike Reconnaissance Group (SRG), the Maritime Patrol Group (MPG), the Air Lift Group (ALG), the Tactical Transport Group (TTG) and the Air Operational Support Group (AOSG). However, the RAAF TTG was short-lived, disbanding in February 1991 after the RAAF helicopter capability was transferred to the Army with the residual TTG Caribou capability folding back into the ALG. The development of the Jindalee over-the-horizon (OTH) radar at the Joint Facility, Alice Springs, also had implications for the RAAF ADGE as it added a new dimension to Australia's wide-area surveillance capabilities. Accordingly, the air force stood up No 1 Radar Surveillance Unit (1RSU), headquartered at Mt Everard, near Alice Springs, on 1 July 1992 and assigned the unit to No 41 Wing. Subsequently, the decision to re-shape the RAAF air defence capability more towards an air battle management capability had further organisational implications. Firstly, all ADF air traffic control services, including at army and navy airfields, were amalgamated within a reformed No 44 Wing and secondly, in 1996, both Nos 41 and 44 Wings were spun-out of the TFG into a new Surveillance and Control Group (SCG). By 1997 the Defence Efficiency Review and the follow-on Defence Reform Program had begun to impact on the RAAF by transferring much of the individual FEG’s maintenance and organic support capabilities to contractors, reducing some FEGs to a group consisting of only one wing, with an obviously unsatisfactory “one-group-commanding-one-wing” command chain. The SRG was also being exposed to new air defence capabilities, especially the increasing availability of look-down radars which eroded the ability of the F-111C to exploit terrain masking during its final approach to a target. It was becoming apparent that in future, the F-111C and F/A-18A forces would need to cooperate tactically to ensure F-111C survivability against improving air defences. But the long-standing silos that segregated the RAAF tactical fighter and strategic strike capabilities ‒ a situation going well back to the fighter and bomber heritages of both capabilities ‒ was a significant institutional barrier to fighter/bomber cooperation. That cultural fighter/bomber segregation was a concern to Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Errol McCormack. With a Sabre and Canberra background; experience participating in the first F-111C cohort (1968); time flying the RF-4C on exchange with the USAF; and his time as OC No 82 Wing flying the F-111C; McCormack “warned” Air Commodore John Quaife of his posting as the first commander of the RAAF Air Combat Group (ACG). After spending 12 months planning the merger of the TFG and SRG, Quaife took up his post as CDR ACG in January 2002, commanding Nos 78, 81 and 82 Wings. The formation of the ACG was accompanied by further development in the new SCG when, in 1999, No 1RSU moved to Edinburgh as a precursor to controlling not only the Alice Springs OTHR but also the new OTH radars at Laverton and Longreach. Those radars came online in mid-2003, completing the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN). Further developments followed, which brought the short-lived existence of the SCG to an end, when it was merged with the MPG ‒ a group which had been reduced to oversighting only one wing; No 92 Wing flying AP-3C aircraft. The SCG/MPG merger saw the establishment on 30 March 2004, of the Surveillance and Response Group (SRG) and with the impending introduction of the RAAF airborne early warning and control capability, the SRG, headquartered at Williamtown, became an FEG of considerable capability, fully justifying the appointment of a commander of air commodore rank. The SRG reached maturity on 1 January 2006, when No 42 Wing was reformed flying the E-7A Wedgetail, joining Nos 41, 44 and 92 Wings in the SRG. In contrast, the ALG saw a long period of organisational stability as it continued its 24/7 role of air transport operations although, in 1999, it gained capability when No 37 SQN traded its 1966 vintage C-130E Hercules for the much-improved C-130J. The AOSG, headquartered at Edinburgh also continued unchanged but not so the Operational Support Group (OSG) at Townsville, where the RAAF strove to retain some of its organic expeditionary support capability, so unthinkingly stripped by the crude and blunt Defence reviews of the 1990s. Certainly the 20 years to 2007 saw much organisational change, but it was re-assuring the RAAF was still able to retain an operational organization, in keeping with the principles of functional force element group reorganisation, first implemented in 1987. Air-Vice Marshal Brian Weston (Retd) was CO No 75 Squadron in 1980, CO Base Squadron Richmond in 1986, OC Base Support Wing Richmond in 1987, and CDR Tactical Fighter Group from July 1990 to July 1993. Brian is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: A War by another name: The RAAF in the Malayan Emergency – 1948 to 1960' in Australian Aviation September 2018 p. 110 This year has seen the recognition of many anniversaries from World War I and World War II but there is one anniversary from another war in which Australia was involved, which has received little attention. It was the declaration, on 18 June 1948, of the commencement of the Malayan Emergency following the murder of three British estate managers by guerrillas of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), at Sungei Siput, Perak, Malaya. The targeted assassination of three estate managers was the opening shot of a war by the MCP aimed at the overthrow of British colonial rule in the Federation of Malaya. Although labelled an ‘Emergency’ – to ensure insurance policies essential to the ongoing functioning of Malaya’s economy were not voided – the Malayan Emergency was a war. It was conducted by the MCP, under the leadership of Chin Peng, employing the military skills and expertise the MCP had gained from its predecessor organisation – the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army – during its 1942-1945 guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. The ethnic core of the MCP was Malayan Chinese who, after an initial campaign of terror, expected to mobilise support for their revolutionary cause from the ethnic Malayan Chinese and the rural ethnic Malay population following which, the MCP expected to escalate to widespread insurgency warfare, sufficient to destabilise and overthrow the incumbent government. The revolutionary strategy was in keeping with similar campaigns under way in Indochina against the French, and in China against the Kuomintang government. Initially, the Federation of Malaya – a federation of the nine Malay British protectorates and of the two Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang, both British colonies – was slow to respond to the MCP threat although that changed, especially after the assassination of the British High Commissioner ‒ the head of the Federation of Malaya ‒ on 6 October 1951. From then on, Britain oversighted a ‘whole of government’ response to the MCP threat; a response which is now widely regarded as an essential case study for any student of counter-insurgency warfare. In 1950, Australia responded to a British request for assistance in combatting the Emergency and deployed six RAAF Lincoln heavy bombers and eight RAAF C-47 Dakota (DC-3) transports to the region: No 1 Squadron to RAF Base Tengah, Singapore, and No 38 Squadron to RAF Base Changi, Singapore. Air support is a key capability in counter insurgency warfare and No 38 Squadron quickly filled an essential role in transporting troops; resupply of deployed troops, often by parachute into small drop zones; and psychological operations. The contribution of the RAAF Dakotas during the initial phases of the Emergency was critical and it is a contribution that has generally not been well-acknowledged. The Dakotas returned to Australia in 1953. The Lincolns, an evolution of the Avro Lancaster, also made a strong contribution to the Emergency with their ability to carry up to 14 x 450 kg bombs. The Lincoln, with its endurance, payload and high capacity British-heritage 1,000 lb (450 kg) blast and fragmentation bombs, was well-suited to the tropical, jungle operational environment and while few communist terrorists, CTs as they were called, were killed directly by the air strikes, the strikes kept the CT groups on the move where they and their camps were more likely to be detected and engaged by deployed troops and police. The Lincolns returned to Australia in 1958 having dropped 85% of the 35,000 tonnes of bombs used in the Emergency. By the time of No 1 Squadron’s return to Australia there was widespread recognition the counter-insurgency war was being won; although such wars take patience and endurance, until they grind to a close. Indeed, although the Malayan Emergency was declared ended on 31 July 1960, RAAF personnel at Butterworth continued to receive intelligence briefings on CT activities and threats into the 1970s, and some would recall watching flights of RMAF Canadair Tebuan jet trainers, each armed with two 500 lb (230 kg) Mk 82 bombs, departing Butterworth to strike CTs operating in the “border areas” not too far from Butterworth. Apart from the RAAF involvement in the Malayan Emergency, Australia also rotated battalions from the Royal Australian Regiment through Malaya ensuring an Australian infantry battalion was continuously in theatre from 1957 to 1963. The Emergency was also noteworthy in that, on 31 August 1957, during the conduct of the Emergency, the Federation of Malaya became an independent nation, and remained on amicable terms with Britain, its former colonial power. During the Emergency, Australian air and ground forces in Malaya transitioned into Australia's contribution to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve which was established in 1955 to deter external communist aggression against countries in South-East Asia, especially Malaya and Singapore. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation and this On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Brian Weston 'On Target: RAAF Butterworth: From “Emergency” to “Strategic Reserve” ' in Australian Aviation October 2018 p. 1 The On Target column in the September issue of Australian Aviation outlined how the RAAF began what was to become a longstanding Australian engagement in South-East Asia. It commenced with Australia’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency in June 1948, which was indeed a war, although a war by a different name. The Malayan Emergency also foreshadowed the long timescales involved in conducting counter-insurgency warfare. This was evident not only from the 12 years it took until the Malayan Emergency was declared ended in 1960, but also from the reality that even after the declared end of the war, small groups of Communist terrorists continued to evade and operate, especially in the northern border areas of Malaya, until well into the 1970s. The Emergency also verified the concerted “whole of government” approach to counter-insurgency warfare which, by 1957, had contained the Communist insurgents such that there was widespread acceptance the Emergency was being won. But, if by 1957 the conduct of the war was proceeding towards victory, how was it that by 1959, 50% of Australia’s operational fighter force and 33% of Australia’s operational bomber force was stationed permanently at Butterworth in northern Malaya? The explanation for this large commitment of Australia’s air force lies in the fact the Malayan Emergency was only one of many security issues evident in post-World War II, South-East Asia. These security issues were of concern especially to Australia, the United States, and to those European nations that, prior to World War II, had substantial colonial and economic interests in South-East Asia. The interests of the colonizing European powers had been disrupted by the rapid advance of the Japanese through South-East Asia and the Pacific in World War II. This illustrated the brittle hold the European powers had over their colonial interests. Notwithstanding, at war’s end the European powers sought to return to their colonial territories but, following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the abrupt end of World War II played havoc with the aspirations of the major European powers. It was only Britain that managed to return quickly and re-establish authority over its South-East Asian colonies and protectorates. France’s attempt to return to Indochina ultimately ended in a demoralizing military defeat, while the Netherlands, early on, had to concede independence to the former Dutch East Indies. As early as 1949, the map of North-East and South-East Asia was being recast. Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party overran mainland China, ejecting the ruling Kuomintang to the island of Taiwan. Indonesia won its brief revolutionary conflict with the Netherlands, although what lay ahead for Indonesia was uncertain. France persisted longer in Indochina. But, with their military defeat at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh, the eight-year war in Indochina also came to an end, fracturing the former French colony of Indochina which would have longer term consequences; while the Korean War of 1950 to 1953 would also have consequences which still are with us today. These conflicts changed the geostrategic and geopolitical make-up of North-East and South-East Asia and contributed to the emergence of the “Domino Theory” with the generally accepted implication the next domino to fall would be Thailand; which is interesting, as Thailand is the only major South-East Asian country not to have been colonized by a European power. This rapidly changing strategic environment drove the establishment of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty when in Manila, in September 1954, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Treaty; with both the Philippines and Thailand seeing merit in the establishment of a “NATO-like” American security guarantee to protect them from potential communist insurgencies. Unsurprisingly, the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) established its headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand. Shortly after, in 1955, the United Kingdom, facing the inevitable independence of its South-East Asian protectorates and states, established the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, a permanent military force aimed at countering external communist aggression against countries in South-East Asia, especially British-colonial Malaya and Singapore. Australia was invited to contribute to the Strategic Reserve, and agreed to deploy on a permanent basis two squadrons of CAC Sabre fighters; one squadron of Canberra bombers, with an embedded flight of supporting Dakota transports; and a range of supporting units to Butterworth in what was soon to become the independent Federation of Malaya. This, a commitment of 1500 RAAF personnel, plus families, in what quickly became RAAF Base Butterworth. It was a national security commitment which was to endure until 1988, before downscaling to the more modest Australian presence which remains at Butterworth today, some 70 years after the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency. Next month’s On Target column will detail the remarkable transition of a small RAF airfield into the major operational base that was to become RAAF Base Butterworth. Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Williams Foundation commanded No 75 Squadron at Butterworth from 1980 to 1982. This On Target article appears in the Australian Aviation magazine. Download pdf

Air / Sea / Land: Integrated Force 2030 11 April 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: Designing the Integrated Force: The Australian Defense Force Repositions for the Next Phase of 21st Century Force Structure Development Presentations VADM Ray Griggs AO, CSC, RAN, Vice Chief of Defence Force The Integrated Force Imperative: Vice Chief of Defence Force (the Joint Force Authority) Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG Jason Blain DSC, CSC, Vice Chief of Defence Force Group Achieving an Integrated Force by Design - Challenges and Opportunities Download Pdf AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Royal Australian Air Force Integrated Force Design - the Air Perspective Presentation unavailable BRIG David Wainwright DSC, Australian Army Integrated Force Design - the Land Perspective Download Pdf CDRE Philip Spedding DSC, AM, RANR, Royal Australian Navy Integrated Force Design - the Sea Perspective Download Pdf Mr Steve Froelich, Lockheed Martin Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable LTGEN USAF (Ret) Jeff Remington, Northrop Grumman Industry’s view on Integrated Design Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Leon Phillips, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Challenges and Opportunities in Acquisition and Sustainment of the Integrated Force Download Pdf AVM Andrew Dowse AM, Chief Information Officer Group Challenges for CIOG in connecting the Integrated Environment Download Pdf RADM Tony Dalton AM, CSM RAN, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group Joint Capability Acquisition Download Pdf Mr Andy Watson, MBDA Australia The Defence/Industry relationship and the Integrated Force Presentation unavailable AVM John Blackburn AO (Retd), Sir Richard Williams Foundation Launch of the Williams IAMD Study - Implications for the Integrated Force Download Pdf

A New Approach, and Attitude, to Electronic Warfare In Australia 23 August 2017 Program and Synopsis Download Pdf Handbook Download Pdf Final Report Dr Robbin Laird, Second Line of Defense The Future of Electonic Warfare Final Report: A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia Download Pdf 08/26/2017 Robbin Laird The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare Presentations BRIG Stephen Beaumont AM, Information Warfare Division, Joint Capabilities Group Growler and Force Level Electronic Warfare Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Glen Braz CSC, DSM, 82 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force An Operators View of Growler Download Pdf Mr Lawrence Burt, Boeing TACAIR Programs Enabling Capability for EA Presentation unavailable AIRCDRE Robert Chipman CSC, Capability Planning – Air Force Royal Australian Air Force EW, C4I and Enablers Download Pdf LtGen Jon Davies (Ret) United States Marine Corp Distributed Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CAPT Steve Dryden RAN, Navy Information Warfare Royal Australian Navy Implications for the Royal Australian Navy Presentation unavailable Dr Brad Ferguson, Raytheon Industry as an Input to Electronic Warfare Capability Presentation unavailable GPCAPT Andrew Gilbert, Air Power Development Centre A Historical Perspective of RAAF Airborne Electronic Attack Presentation notes Download Pdf Mr Jeffrey D. “JD” McCreary Georgia Tech Research Institute The Future of Electronic Warfare Download Pdf CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet The USN Approach to Achieving EMS Superiority Download Pdf MAJGEN Kathryn Toohey AM, CSC, Land Capability Australian Army Implications for the Australian Army Presentation unavailable