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Dr Robbin Laird, Enabling and Defending the National Information Society: The Space Dimension, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Some time ago – more than a decade – I worked with Alan Dupas , the noted French space expert, on a project for a European space company on the future of space in 2020. We focused on the key point that although a space company was most closely identified with launchers and satellites, the future was its engagement in the global information society. Let me say that we were not greeted with cheers and love. Rather the major company we were dealing with shuddered at the thought that its “things” might be overshadowed by a product – data, communications and information. This of course puts a space company into competition with a range of providers of data, communications and information. Space is enabler of much which goes on in earth providing the nodes and networks of an information society. But space is costly, complex and governments are loath to invest more than they have to in such “esoteric” technology whose investments might cut into social spending or green energy or whatever the priority is for a sitting government. This is certainly the case for Australia. Dr. Malcolm Davis at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar provided a compelling case for Australian space investments and acceleration of engagement in the space sector. This is how presented and discussed this important subject: Space is contested and congested. When we’re talking about resilience, both being contested and congested are really becoming much more acute as a challenge. Assuring space access for the ADF can be defined in different ways, but I would argue that it’s not just about being able to use a foreign provider. It is also about sovereign space capabilities. Space domain awareness allows space control. If you look at the national defense strategy and integrated investment program, it highlighted space domain awareness. Then importantly made the point that space control is an important task for the ADF.. We can’t have assured access to space if we only rely on foreign launch providers to give us that capability. We need to prioritize our national space capabilities, including sovereign launch. We need to pursue space policy as a whole of nation endeavor. We don’t currently have that. It was started by the previous government. Those efforts were canceled by the current government. I would argue that we need to restore a whole of nation space strategy. Space is an operational domain in its own right… We’re seeing in the arsenals of our adversaries counter space capabilities. And these capabilities do not apply only in hot war scenarios. They could also be used in terms of gray zone operations as well… We need to think in terms of how we defend against what the Chinese call system destruction warfare or how they can utilize counter space capabilities along with cyber attack, electromagnetic operations, and kinetic operations to take down critical Information Infrastructure as quickly as possible… Part of resilience is managing space traffic and that requires a new approach to how we think about space domain awareness, how we manage the increasing amount of material that’s in orbit. Space is increasingly competitive in the sense that it’s no longer just the sole domain of the major powers. It is also about the activity of small to medium powers, including Australia, as well as commercial actors. And space has become democratized through a combination of falling costs that are driven by new technologies which allows more states to do things in space than previously was considered possible or financially viable. That means there is a greater possibility that you could get either non state actors, commercial actors or hostile state actors essentially using space in a way that’s inimical to our interests. But it also brings opportunities in the sense that more states like Australia can actually do things in space that previously were beyond our capabilities… We’re starting to think about space 3.0. Space 1.0 was the Apollo era of big space agencies and the activities were the taxpayer funded and government led. Space 2.0 was the establishment and the emergence of commercial space activities which really transformed the space environment and global space activity, Space 3.0 is that next step that beckons in the future. It’s that opportunity to do space-based industry and a manufacturing capability, a space based economy that exploits space resources and new environments such as lunar space. We have to challenge the orthodox mindsets that I think currently exist within government which primarily thinks about space in terms of satellites and rockets and start thinking about how we can utilize space in radically new and different ways that generate prosperity and growth. He then went on to discuss how adversarial actions in space (war in space) can bring down or dismantle space infrastructure and that this infrastructure is a key part of a functioning information system for Australia. This meant that the Australian government needed to get out of any stoved-piped look at space and take a broader view which would include space policy in the whole of nation concept of defence. A slide from Dr. Davis’s presentation at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He then added: The democratization of space technology means that space is no longer dominated purely by the major actors, so it’s far more unpredictable as an operating environment. Increasingly, counter space technologies are moving in radically different ways and posing direct threats to space assets. For example, If you think back to the Cold War, there was no such thing as cyber warfare. Now we have the potential opportunity for cyber-attacks on satellites that can create scalable or reversible effects to disable or deny. And so suddenly, space weapons or space warfare or counter space capabilities become far more usable because it’s in the interests of our adversaries to use them. And I think that our adversaries recognize that space warfare and counter space capabilities can generate decisive strategic effect. Space is critical for maintaining how we fight wars and how we undertake joint and integrated operations across multiple domains, but it’s also vital for sustaining our information-based economies and societies… Modern information-based societies depend on space capabilities to function, in particular through satellite communications, but also positioning, navigation and timing services. Everything that we do in a modern society from using information on our mobile phones, to our computers, to stock markets, logistics systems, all of that depends on the space capabilities. That dependency will grow in the future, particularly as we get more and more reliant on processes of change associated with the Internet of Things and pursue the fourth industrial revolution. Such transitions demand that we have continued access to space Dr. Davis then went on the identify the various means of space attack and degradation which adversaries have already demonstrated. And his point was clear – If Australia wants to protect its free and open society, if it wants to support a “rules-based” order which in my view is shrinking globally, how can you do so without an effective space engagement policy? Featured Photo: Dr. Davis speaking too the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

Dr Robbin Laird, Defence Industry in Australia: Building Strategic Depth and Resilience in Support of the Ready Force, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) The September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation focused on accelerating the capabilities of the ready force. Defence industry in Australia is obviously a key player in the ability for the government to find ways to enhance the ready force. A panel of six industrial representatives discussed this challenge lead by Katherine Ziesing of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation as the facilitator. The six panelists in order of providing presentations were as follows: Andrew Doyle, Director, Business Area Lead, Aeronautics from Lockheed Martin Aeronautics; Nick Leake, Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus; Derek Reinhardt, Director of Engineering and Operational Excellence, Northrop Grumman Australia; Dr. Brad Ferguson, Joint Battlespace Systems Technical Director, Raytheon Australia; Daniel Reiniger, Engineering Manager MQ-28A Ghost Bat Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), The Boeing Company; and Dr. Gary Eves, Principal Technology Officer of CAE Defense and Security. The first speaker, Andrew Doyle, underscored how he viewed industry and its role in Australian defence resilience. The critical enablers to growth in industry capacity–your experienced workforce, your facilities, and your capital equipment– have lead times of years to establish the scale that Australia will potentially need. We’re already operating in a contested environment in terms of competing with other national priorities. With defence, where government is typically the owner, the operator and the regulator of defence systems, there’s definitely a role for government to play in fostering that ecosystem for defence industry to be able to grow the scale and depth that Australia needs to be calling upon in the future. To do this requires a well-considered investment strategy and in my view, a partnership with industry whereby industry can make investments that lead to capacity for them and capability for the ADF. Any disruption in investment ensures that capability will not be there for the ADF. Doyle put his assessment this way: I will now talk about industry’s role in building a resilient and scalable national defence ecosystem which starts with the basics of depth of industry presence and a close degree of integration between industry and defense. Industry needs to have the appropriate degree of insight into defence plans and capability and preparedness requirements for defence to leverage the additional mass and scale that industry can bring. The key to success is communication and close partnerships to ensure that we’re getting alignment of resources and actions to best affect where industry can contribute to the operational viability of the integrated force… Andrew Doyle, Director, Business Area Lead, Aeronautics from Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, The second panelist was Nick Leake. He underscored that the ADF cannot operate effectively without secure C2 and ISR, and that in today’s world this means secure access to space and to satellites. He noted that Optus currently operates three geo satellites, one of which carries defence payloads. Leake then highlighted the coming of the Optus 11 satellite which he indicated would be the first software-defined satellite in the region. He underscored: With these new spacecrafts you will have fundamental intelligence on board, and you will be able to configure that satellite in terms of its capacity and where you’re actually pointing that capacity. Putting a chip on board the spacecraft obviously then opens up further issues with cyber security, because you’re putting intelligence in space, and you have to protect that asset the best you can. He then highlighted Optus working on in orbit servicing which will allow the satellite service life to be extended as fuel tanks are replaced on the satellite in orbit. He next discussed the LEO revolution which is obviously a significant transformer of the space satellite eco system but indicated that Optus worked with partners to leverage LEO constellations and to shape an adaptive network. Leake highlighted the importance of Dr. Davis’s presentation on the need for enhanced sovereign space capability and indicated that Optus was a key part of any such effort. Nick Leake, Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus The third presenter was Derek Reinhardt from Northrop Grumman Australia. His focus was on their work in enhancing the efficacy of sustainment in support of the ready force. NG is involved in the sustainment of the KC-30, the C-27J, the VIP fleet and the Triton. About two years ago, we were trying to bring all of our programs together and have them work in a more consistent way. To do so, we set about building a sustainment delivery model which was really intended initially to align our programs, but it’s providing us interesting insights into the information that moves within a sustainment environment: the speed that that information needs to move, the decisions that hang off that information and how the enterprise combines to be able to do so. He then when on to describe their creation in effect of a digital twin of the sustainment system. He went to argue that through this effort they have enhanced their ability to focus on the critical enablers for managing the information flows for decision making in the sustainment enterprise. He noted: What we’ve really learned to be successful, the architecture, the cyber-worthiness, and the whole concept of the data fabric is absolutely vital. When applied to the challenge of sustainment in a contested environment or contested logistics, this led him to the conclusion: How the data fabric is architected is crucial for it to continue to operate. Derek Reinhardt, Director of Engineering and Operational Excellence, Northrop Grumman Australia The fourth speaker was Dr. Brad Ferguson from Raytheon Australia. He certainly underscored the importance of enhancing the sense of urgency and speed to turn innovations into combat capabilities. This is how he put it: We need to adapt our architectures to support plugins for new capabilities, new technologies to support the rapid growth and leverage those technologies, everything from AI to quantum to hypersonics to directed energy to autonomy, these things will shape the future battlefield. He argued that the challenge and opportunity is to combine international cooperation with Australian delivery of capability. He then provided an example of this approach. We started with the NASAMS system fielded in nine other countries, and then we built it from the ground up, integrating it with Australian innovation. Working with over 30 companies across Australia, we integrated CEA radars, novel electrooptic infrared systems, new tactical data links to integrate with the Australian internet and military teams, integrating new missiles to leverage in service munitions, and ended up with the most capable short range ground-based air defence system in the world. Some of those Australian innovations are now making their way back into the global community, supporting our allies and allowing for export opportunities. Dr. Brad Ferguson, Joint Battlespace Systems Technical Director, Raytheon Australia The fifth speaker was Daniel Reiniger of The Boeing Company. His presentation was short and succinct and focused on a key area of developing and incorporating autonomous systems into the ADF. This is what he highlighted: What we need to focus on is building something that’s built to adapt. That’s in the wheelhouse of the collaborative combat aircraft, because if we don’t build something that’s adaptable, it will be obsolete before we even get it fielded. How do we evolve our thinking, so we actually build something that’s adaptable? The answer that we’re coming to is embracing open mission system standards and embracing not just open architectures, but government defined open architectures. What does that do? It opens up a best of industry ecosystem where everyone can come to the party. It lowers the barrier of entry. When we talk about CCAs, we talk about machine autonomy, we talk about flight autonomy, we talk about crewed and uncrewed teaming. It’s simply too much for any one company to build the platform and then pull all of that together in a coherent manner. By expanding the ecosystem and lowering the barrier to entry, you can get smaller and more companies that have niche skills into the effort. Daniel Reiniger, Engineering Manager MQ-28A Ghost Bat Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), The Boeing Company The final presentation was by Dr. Gary Eves from CAE Defense and Security who highlighted the growing importance in training and innovations in training to enhance the operational capability of the ready force. He started by talking about the challenge for today’s force in terms of training. One of the things we need to understand is that the one size fits all approach just does not work for training. That requires a fundamental change in how we do things. What we are trying to do is evolve the capability of our young people to work with incredibly complex systems. Now it’s not just a question of pure technical proficiency. They are decision makers. They’re operating in a highly complex environment that requires dynamic decision making en masse, in real time, maybe without support. He highlighted the importance of training for effective operation by teams in performing key tasks and missions which not only lead to mission success but to more rewarding experiences which are important in being to retain the personnel which you want and need for the organization. He also underscored the importance of shaping effective ways for training in a coalition environment. This especially challenging because of different historical, linguistic and cultural experiences. CAE has worked and is working on a variety of approaches to succeed in the demanding training environments for the ready force operating in the new strategic environment. Dr. Gary Eves, Principal Technology Officer of CAE Defense and Security There was a Q and A session after the panel presentations but the key focus was on the crucial need to reshape the partnership with government both for defence and commercial firms. As one participant put it: Don’t try to design something in five years, because by the time you get it in five years, it’s obsolete. We need an agile approach whereby we can build a capability, and then, over the years, we can add to that capability. Governments have to take some of the risk, and stop chucking the risk onto industry, because a lot of industries, particularly small business, will just walk away. If we have a shared risk and investment approach, we can have an agile model of delivering capability. And the concept of “relational contracting” was introduced in a discussion of sustainment and support for the ready force, but perhaps has a wider application. As one participant put it: Relational contracting is an environment of defining how we work together, rather than defining specific technical requirements. Our best performing sustainment programs are those where you create the right relationship, you create the right dialog. A shared situational awareness is created and shared understanding of who makes the right decision at the right time and with the right information which builds the trust that’s needed for the desired outcome.

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Airpower in a Contested Region: The Perspective of Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Air Vice Marshal Braz participated in the latest Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 26, 2024. His presentation and engagement were as part of a panel with Rear Admiral Christopher Smith, Commander Australian Fleet which focused on how to generate mass for the ready force. I had chance to meet with him and to enhance the discussion in a meeting in his office. I had the privilege of interviewing him when he was at Amberley Airbase commanding the Wing which hosted the new Growler squadron. And then again when he presented at the August 23, 2017 Williams Foundation seminar on the future of electronic warfare. Obviously, his experience with electronic warfare put him at the heart of evolving combat realities, namely the core significance of prevailing in the electro-magnetic spectrum. During the discussion in his office, we went over the major elements of his presentation but discussed in more detail his point regarding the need to have a sense of urgency. It is crucial from a ready force perspective to drive change in how one organizationally shapes the force. This is how he put it: We need to enhance a sense of urgency in shaping the ready force. We’ve been very habitualized in managing long lead, large programs with long gestation and comprehensive oversight. We have done so through a slow approval process with rigorous analysis which deliver exquisite systems which allow us to shape a framework around which we can operate and with which we can operate, But such an approach is lacking in terms of providing rapidly what the near-term enhanced force in being sees as immediate needs. Such a system doesn’t naturally deliver the enhancements that I would seek for the ready force in a timely manner. We need to adjust our focus on defense preparedness to encompass organizational change that can quickly deliver near-term solutions identified by our forces in being. It was clear that as Air Commander Australia, Air Vice Marshal Braz has to be prepared for the ready force to support the missions directed by the Joint force commander. And one might put it that adaptation of the force under duress is a key driver of change, and the challenge is organizationally how to build in the capacity to drive force design from such a perspective rather than doing so primarily from the standpoint of the core platforms to be acquired in the future, And this approach underscores the importance of trusting the operational force to identify gaps to be met. Air Vice Marshal Braz put it this way: We talk increasingly about the workforce having a warfighter mindset. The ability and willingness for people to adapt is going to be fundamental to our war fighting effectiveness. I need every human that we have contributing to the effort, and I need them to be contributing in ways that they haven’t even figured out apply to them yet. There’s a trust equation inherent in mission rehearsal. In mission rehearsals, we find gaps, and we look for rapid ways, perhaps imperfect, to remedy the gaps. And then we try to give technology that we think will solve known problems to our workforce, and we let them have the license to integrate it and operate with it in ways that we probably never imagined that they would. But with their creativity and their adaptability they find ways to do so. By then adopting the solutions they find into the ready force, we are incentivizing them to work in an innovative way that makes the ready force better in the near term. I pointed out that when he was working in EW, it is an area which succeeds only by staying ahead of the game. In EW or more generally in Tron Warfare, it is crucial to ensure that the force has transient software advantage. In this graphic developed several years ago and presented to me during a visit to Australia, this challenge was visually imagined this way: Air Vice Marshal Braz further emphasized: One needs to be able to rebuild the force quickly, and that applies across the whole system of capabilities. We need to adapt quickly. And another element that I’m really interested in is our ability to generate tempo despite potentially disaggregating the force for survivability and for maneuver within that disaggregation. But I need to be able to catch the adversary off guard and to punch multiple times in diverse ways and axis of maneuver. We need to be able to maximize our force and do things that will disrupt the enemy’s thinking, and do the unexpected, which is going to be important for us a small force. We need to be a smart force to which can provide technological advantage in the sense of being able to have ongoing and transient advantage. Braz highlighted that collaboration among the Australian, American and British Air Warfare Centers provided an important way for the RAAF to explore concrete ways to get better value out of the ready force, and to cross-learn ways to gain combat advantages through enhanced training and identifying combat gaps that need to be and can be filled by technological or other fixes. He argued: We can find ways to seek asymmetry and apply new technology quickly. I thank such a capability is a key contributor to the deterrence equation.

Dr Robbin Laird, The Challenge of Shaping the Way Ahead for the Ready Force and Preparing for Future Threats, 5 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Prior to the 26 September 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar which focused on shaping a way ahead for the ready force, I spoke with John Conway to get his perspective on the focus of the seminar. With four decades experience in the business of air combat across operations and industry, John is identified this way on the foundation website: John is the Managing Director of Felix, an independent company providing specialist capability development and operational analysis services to Defence since 2017. He was previously a business development and strategy executive with Raytheon Australia specialising in air combat integration, electronic warfare, advanced weapons systems, test and training ranges, and integrated air and missile defence. John retired from the Royal Air Force as a Group Captain in 2010 having served 24 years in a number flying, staff and senior command roles. His operational experience on F4 Phantom and Tornado F3 aircraft included Cold War Europe, the South Atlantic, the Balkans, and the Middle East. He commanded the United Kingdom’s largest Permanent Joint Operating Base at RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus between 2005 and 2008 enabling the airbridge into Iraq and Afghanistan, and supporting strategic ISR operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Conway underscored that the foundation seminars had most recently focused on the strategic redesign of the government for the ADF. But the future is not yet here, and the question is how lethal and survivable and effective is the ADF now in its operations? How can it be more effective in the near term? And how are the ADF and defence industry focused on doing so? “For defence leadership, there is a very complex challenge of balancing investments in today’s battles and the future ones. But to understand the challenges for the ready force we need to get outside of the Canberra environment and understand how operational commanders and the ready force are addressing current challenges and shaping a practical way ahead. “We have threats squeezing the defence force. We have a challenging fiscal environment. Despite starting from a less-than-ideal situation, how do we operate more effectively in the here and now while keeping an eye on the future? How do we get everybody to work together to create outcomes greater than the sum of the parts?” He then discussed the late Cold War period where the West understood that it was at a disadvantage with the Soviet Union in a number of areas but worked on building its own asymmetric advantages as part of a credible deterrent structure. He argued that we need the same attitude and approach for today’s world as well. By focusing on our competitive advantages and enhancing them, one can build a pathway to reinforce the ready force and build for the future. He identified a number of areas for particular attention where activities today can shape the development of the future force. The first is the sophisticated exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in both defensive and offensive counter air missions. Here he discussed the importance of enhancing the resilience and redundancy in our systems and honing a kill web approach which makes the denial of core ADF electromagnetic capabilities very difficult and hence enhancing the overall deterrent effect. The second was the question of shaping credible ways ahead to build combat mass. Here the focus is upon building and operating within the ready force various types of autonomous collaborative systems and working them in as key enablers of the payloads necessary for a significantly enhanced integrated force. The third is strengthening the enablers of a kill web, notably in terms of C2 and distributed ISR and the ability to perform effective counter-ISR against the adversary. Central to this is an enterprise approach to mission data management and reprogramming for the integrated force. Work is being done to enable the ready force now and how it is being done is shaping the future force as well. He concluded with a very important core point about leveraging and building on the ready force and our lessons learned in the Cold War as we build the future force. “I think going back to some of the traditional ways that we’ve done things in the Cold War and making them more contemporary by the exploitation of new radio frequency technologies and putting the money into the back end of the systems, through the networks, the comms architecture, the mission data environment, and start bringing tempo as well to the way we operate. “It sounds a little bit more like an evolution rather than a revolution. And I think that’s fair. We don’t need to destroy everything that we’ve learned in the past. We just need to keep investing in that next stage and accept that the future probably is a smaller available workforce, and this means we need to effectively exploit technology such as autonomous systems for an enhanced ready force.”

Dr Robbin Laird, How Does the Ready Force Deal with a Rapidly Changing Operational Environment? 4 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) It is fine to have long-range force structure planning, but what happens when the operational environment is rapidly changing for your operational force? How to adapt the ready force effectively and adeptly in a timely manner? And what consequences does that have for one’s long-range force structure design? The presentation by Jennifer Parker, Expert Associate National Security College of the Australian National University, focused on a key challenge which raises such questions. Her presentation was entitled: “The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?” What she focused on was the changing nature of littoral maritime operations, the emergence of new technologies and concepts of operations by various actors notably in the Black and Red Seas, and how those shifts in approach affected maritime operations. The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals. But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies. And a point outside of her presentation was inherent within it: what is the future of capital ships integrating maritime autonomous systems? For defence? For offense? Or as I would put it, it is not a question of crewed versus uncrewed vessels. It is about how crewed vessels could leverage offboard assets like maritime autonomous systems or air systems for the projection of effect or defence in depth. Jennifer Parker speaking at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation. Her first case study was of the Black Sea and contested littoral operations there. She argued that: The range of the littoral is increasing. Ukraine has effectively used uncrewed surface vessels, cruise missiles and UAVs to target ships at greater ranges. Now we don’t know the exact ranges of some of the uncrewed surface vessels that Ukraine has operated, but certainly they managed to hit the Kursk bridge at about 300 nautical miles from Ukrainian controlled territory. That is a dramatic change in terms of the range of the littoral. Ukraine has managed to destroy about 30% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and certainly pushed them back from Ukraine and territorial seas and from Crimea, and that’s no mean feat when you look at the USV engagements, But what must considered is how the Russian ships have defended themselves. They have no countermeasures whatsoever. They’re barely maneuvering or defending themselves…As offensive capability evolves, we need to be working hard on what the defensive capability is and integrating it into our platforms. She noted as well that USVs can certainly attack ports and port infrastructure. This means that there need to be countermeasures for this new threat as well. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Range of the littoral is increasing Sea denial strategy in enclosed seas Ship preparedness / posture is key Balance between development of offensive / defensive balance (capability / counter capability) Maritime trade does not stop during conflict Importance of port infrastructure protection Her second case study was of the Red Sea and the approach of the Houthis to disruption in the littorals. She argued that: The Houthis have been successful in changing the direction of maritime trade. There have been over 100 attacks now on merchant shipping, and 30 of these attacks have managed to sink a couple of ships. This shows the vulnerability of choke points using the kind of systems and technology available to the Houthis. They have attacked but not damaged surface combatants. She underscored that prepared surface vessels have successfully defended themselves but two problems have been underscored for the ready force. First, the fleet needs to find ways to be rearmed with missiles while at sea. Second, the fleet needs to find much cheaper ways to defeat the unmanned strike force directed against the fleet. She argued that it was necessary for the ready force to be “stressed tested” by engaging in such deployments to evolve its combat edge. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Vulnerability of chokepoints Continuing relevance of surface combatants Magazine depth / Replenishment at sea Integration of counter-drone capabilities Importance of stress testing capabilities Continuing relevance of convoy operations Strategic depth in maritime fleet Defence / maritime industry coordination Maritime trade doesn’t stop / it evolves Her third case study was of the PRC actions against the Philippines. The key takeaways from her analysis were the following: Blurring of civil maritime security threats Criticality of maritime domain awareness Effective presence operations require quantity of forces Integration of information operations into wider campaign strategy And finally she addressed the active threats to sea laid cables which are critical to the information flows globally. Here she asked the poignant question: “Whose responsibility for such defense is this in Australia? And what are we doing about it?” This challenge is a key one, which parts of NATO are finally addressing in Europe. For example, in the recent NORDIC WARDEN Exercise, the UK and Northern European nations exercised their forces to shape a con-ops to deal with this, although the exercise indicated important technology and force structure gaps to deal with the challenge. With regard to operations in the Red Sea, she noted: A number of the European navies who have gone through their workups and gone through their test and evaluation have sent ships to the Red Sea and learned very quickly that their combat systems and their missile systems were not up for the fight and had to withdraw them. That is something that we want to learn before we are getting multiple missiles shot at us in the event of a more significant conflict. Parker underscored the really crucial point that when it comes to naval operations, the military and the civilian aspects are intertwined. Australia depends on maritime trade, which will need to continue in times of conflict, and to do so, the military and civilian parts of the equation need to be clearly working together. She noted: We’ve learned that defence and maritime industry need to coordinate now. That’s something that we consistently relearn, and that has been a key point of the defence of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and something that Australia needs to think about as we try and grow our maritime industry with strategic fleet… Maritime trade does not stop in the event of conflict, so the view that we don’t need to worry about it or that we just need to worry about protecting Australia has not borne itself out in our previous world wars and it is not bearing itself out in the Black Sea or the Red Sea. And what is happening in the west Philippine Sea is a clear blurring of civil maritime security threats. This is something that we need to pay attention to. We currently have a civil maritime strategy. We have a military maritime strategy, and the two don’t connect. It’s not too far to think that an adversary could try to overwhelm Australia’s maritime domain through using what we would continue consider civil maritime threats. And to Parker’s point about “Ship preparedness / posture is key”:

Dr Robbin Laird, The Chief of the Australian Army Explains How They are Dealing with the Simultaneous Challenges of the Three R’s, 3 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) In the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams seminar, we focused on how the force in being can evolve effectively in the near to mid-term as investments are being made in future force capabilities, most notably the new SSNs. This means that the services have to deal with three challenges simultaneously or what one might call the three R’s: Re-structuring or redesign, readiness and resilience. I had a chance to discuss how the Australian Army was dealing with these challenges in a meeting in the office of Lt. General Simon Stuart on September 29, 2024. Lt. General Stuart underscored: We must do all three simultaneously. That means that we have to change the way we are set up and the way we work. Previously, we did our force generation, force modernisation and readiness activities separately. They were three different parts of the force. We had a readiness model where we consumed readiness while we were deployed. We cannot operate that way anymore, as we did in the so-called ‘wars of choice’. We start with the consideration that time is the key resource. It is insufficient to invest our time in three different activities and then converge on an operation. We assign land forces to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), and I give him a level of assurance that these forces are ready and at a clearly defined readiness level. CJOPS assigns the mission and tasks for the particular operation, activity or investment. Now – In a new way of working, I will also assign tasks in support of force generation and force modernization objectives. When we deploy, whether onshore or offshore, bilaterally or multilaterally, we are going to make the best return on investment we possibly can. For example, the forward deployed forces working in Indonesia as part of Exercise Super Garuda Shield, worked with a partner, had assigned tasks from CJOPS and me. The tasks from me may be individual and/or collective training objectives, or in support of force modernization. There might be an experiment. They may have new kit, and I might task them to figure out what tactics, techniques and procedures we must adopt to employ and integrate this new kit on operations. In other words, we are flipping the model from one where we consume readiness when we’re deployed to one where we build readiness while we deployed. If we are doing that consistently across all operations, activities and investments, and we are doing that at scale, then we start to build readiness across the force. We cannot afford a model where we have one part of the force at a high state of readiness, and the rest of the force at low levels of readiness. It is very expensive and inefficient. We must be disciplined in understanding the difference between training levels and readiness levels. I noted that the Army was a crucial force for working partnerships across the region, and frankly, I consider a major contribution of the ADF to enhance its operational capabilities out to the Solomon Islands. The Army can provide the kind of local knowledge and local partnerships crucial for the defence of Australia and for the region. Lt General Stuart certainly agreed. Some of the value of land forces is in presence and persistence, and those relationships you need in terms of placement, access and understanding the situation, the micro terrain, understanding the littorals, understanding the ports and the airports, understanding the language, the local culture. What does normal look like? And how do you detect what’s different? How do you characterise threat? We then return to a discussion of readiness built as well through a change in the training process. Lt General Stuart underscored this approach as follows: We have changed markedly since the so-called ‘wars of choice’. Back then a battle group would go the Combat Training Center and be trained for a specific mission and theater. The trainers provided a full mission profile environment for the specific theater of operation. Today the battle group comes to the training center and is provided with a full mission profile for various operational environments and the Commander trains their unit or formation. That is how we are building readiness now. We then shifted to the discussion of force structure redesign. Lt General Stuart emphasized the following: In terms of force structure redesign, it is 18 months last week since the 2023 Defense Strategic Review. The Army has moved very quickly to execute on our mission and tasks, and our transformation. In that time, we have rewritten the land domain concept, the land operating concept (which translates the joint or the integrated force concept into the land force component), and translated the Chief of Joint Operations plans into force structure and readiness requirements for the Army. We have rewritten a number of the subordinate concepts, for example, the special operations concept. We have re-organized the Army. We have changed its disposition, and we are getting after the reorganization of units at brigade and at battlegroup level, changed the way we do operational command and control and the physical footprint and disposition of our formation level headquarters. We have created a dispersed nodal structure. We understand the bandwidth requirements, the data exchange requirements, the data standards and the architecture needed in order to operate in this manner. How does the Army contribute to and draw upon the combined kill web? We have been exercising and experimenting over the last four years across northern Australia with the first brigade which is our lead unit for littoral operations. We’ve been doing that across the North of Australia and projecting into the Northwest. We’ve been doing that with our teammates in the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, and U.S. Army Pacific and specifically with their composite watercraft company. We have leased civilian stern landing vessels to practice and to experiment and figure out how we’re going to incorporate new weapons, new watercraft, new digital systems in order to meet our operational mission. It is experimentation with a focus on ‘learn by doing’ and builds readiness in the process. We are redesigning the Army in a very practical way. And the way that our soldiers have embraced innovation from the ground up to solve operational problems is just phenomenal. It’s a work in progress, but it’s moving quickly, and we are working with every partner, whether industry, allies or the other services to get after these problems. In that way, the redesign turns upside down the capability development and delivery process. We used to start with the major system, let’s say watercraft. We then built some facilities, we trained some people, we did some Operational Test and Evaluation, and then we fielded the system. That process would traditionally take about a decade for a major system. One of the requirements of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review is to change the way that the Government, Defence and the other agencies do acquisition. While we wait for those changes to occur, we’re doing what we can with what we have and taking that approach already. For example, the very last thing to be delivered for the littoral maneuver capability will be the watercraft. We’ll have the doctrine, the concepts, the tactics, techniques and procedures already adopted. We will already have adopted different structures, different ways of working, and different equipment sets to support how our formations fight. The third piece, which you asked about, was resilience. We are not going to fight alone nor are we going to sustain ourselves on our own. We are working with small and medium enterprises, Australian enterprises notably, as well as the large primes we are associated with, to build the magazine depth and effectors we need for today and tomorrow’s fight, particularly when it comes to long-range strike. The other aspect to resilience is what I call ‘adaptive reuse’. In other words, what do we have that can be reused in different ways – perhaps with a technical inject? Because you go with the kit you’ve got in a ‘fight tonight’ situation. How can we use our extant kit in different ways through the application of technology or by integrating it into a human-machine team? We are building an ecosystem that fosters innovation from the ground up, adding resources to it, and we’re getting some great results. We have completely changed the mission of our 1st Armored Regiment which was previously a tank regiment, but it is now the lead trace for applied modernisation in our Army. It is the center of a network of industry, military and academia focused on solving today’s problems by putting new kit in the hands of our soldiers and enabling them to figure out how they are going to best use it operationally. Featured Image: Defence Advisor, Colonel Corey Shillabeer, Malaysian Chief of Army General Datuk Muhammad Hafizuddeain bin Jantan, Chief of Australian Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart AO DSC, and Malaysian Defence Advisor to Australia Colonel Mahammad Fazli pose for a group photo, during the bilateral engagement program as part of the Chief of Army Symposium 2024 in Melbourne, Victoria. September 12, 2024 Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Dr Robbin Laird, Shaping a Way Ahead for Airpower in a Contested Region: The Perspective of Air Vice Marshal Glen Braz, 7 October 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Air Vice Marshal Braz participated in the latest Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 26, 2024. His presentation and engagement were as part of a panel with Rear Admiral Christopher Smith, Commander Australian Fleet which focused on how to generate mass for the ready force. I had chance to meet with him and to enhance the discussion in a meeting in his office. I had the privilege of interviewing him when he was at Amberley Airbase commanding the Wing which hosted the new Growler squadron. And then again when he presented at the August 23, 2017 Williams Foundation seminar on the future of electronic warfare. Obviously, his experience with electronic warfare put him at the heart of evolving combat realities, namely the core significance of prevailing in the electro-magnetic spectrum. During the discussion in his office, we went over the major elements of his presentation but discussed in more detail his point regarding the need to have a sense of urgency. It is crucial from a ready force perspective to drive change in how one organizationally shapes the force. This is how he put it: We need to enhance a sense of urgency in shaping the ready force. We’ve been very habitualized in managing long lead, large programs with long gestation and comprehensive oversight. We have done so through a slow approval process with rigorous analysis which deliver exquisite systems which allow us to shape a framework around which we can operate and with which we can operate, But such an approach is lacking in terms of providing rapidly what the near-term enhanced force in being sees as immediate needs. Such a system doesn’t naturally deliver the enhancements that I would seek for the ready force in a timely manner. We need to adjust our focus on defense preparedness to encompass organizational change that can quickly deliver near-term solutions identified by our forces in being. It was clear that as Air Commander Australia, Air Vice Marshal Braz has to be prepared for the ready force to support the missions directed by the Joint force commander. And one might put it that adaptation of the force under duress is a key driver of change, and the challenge is organizationally how to build in the capacity to drive force design from such a perspective rather than doing so primarily from the standpoint of the core platforms to be acquired in the future, And this approach underscores the importance of trusting the operational force to identify gaps to be met. Air Vice Marshal Braz put it this way: We talk increasingly about the workforce having a warfighter mindset. The ability and willingness for people to adapt is going to be fundamental to our war fighting effectiveness. I need every human that we have contributing to the effort, and I need them to be contributing in ways that they haven’t even figured out apply to them yet. There’s a trust equation inherent in mission rehearsal. In mission rehearsals, we find gaps, and we look for rapid ways, perhaps imperfect, to remedy the gaps. And then we try to give technology that we think will solve known problems to our workforce, and we let them have the license to integrate it and operate with it in ways that we probably never imagined that they would. But with their creativity and their adaptability they find ways to do so. By then adopting the solutions they find into the ready force, we are incentivizing them to work in an innovative way that makes the ready force better in the near term. I pointed out that when he was working in EW, it is an area which succeeds only by staying ahead of the game. In EW or more generally in Tron Warfare, it is crucial to ensure that the force has transient software advantage. In this graphic developed several years ago and presented to me during a visit to Australia, this challenge was visually imagined this way: Air Vice Marshal Braz further emphasized: One needs to be able to rebuild the force quickly, and that applies across the whole system of capabilities. We need to adapt quickly. And another element that I’m really interested in is our ability to generate tempo despite potentially disaggregating the force for survivability and for maneuver within that disaggregation. But I need to be able to catch the adversary off guard and to punch multiple times in diverse ways and axis of maneuver. We need to be able to maximize our force and do things that will disrupt the enemy’s thinking, and do the unexpected, which is going to be important for us a small force. We need to be a smart force to which can provide technological advantage in the sense of being able to have ongoing and transient advantage. Braz highlighted that collaboration among the Australian, American and British Air Warfare Centers provided an important way for the RAAF to explore concrete ways to get better value out of the ready force, and to cross-learn ways to gain combat advantages through enhanced training and identifying combat gaps that need to be and can be filled by technological or other fixes. He argued: We can find ways to seek asymmetry and apply new technology quickly. I thank such a capability is a key contributor to the deterrence equation.

The Foundation’s Chair, Air Marshal (Retd) Geoff Brown AO, who is also the former Chief of Air Force, was quoted in the public media this month on investing in integrated air and missile defence. In an article in The Australian, Brown warns that Australian military personnel and key bases remain highly vulnerable to missile attacks, highlighting that they will be vulnerable for at least another decade under the prevailing circumstances. Alongside former Chief of Army Peter Leahy, he underscores the need to prioritise funding for essential air and missile defence systems. Despite a recent acquisition of armed drones, critical gaps in missile defence persist, potentially requiring U.S. intervention to safeguard strategic bases. "At the moment, the Americans will probably bring their own [missiles for shared Top End base defence], I suspect," Brown noted. The article also features insights from other experts who stress the critical need for a "layered air and missile defence capability" and advocate for a significant budget realignment to address these vulnerabilities. Read the full article by Ben Packham for more details.

Dr Robbin Laird, Mike Pezzullo on the Strategic Shift For Australian Defence, 21 April 2024 Link to article (Defense.info) Australia as do all liberal democratic societies face significant limits on what they spend or what they can mobilize for defence. But with the changing strategic situation in which power is diffused globally, multi-polar authoritarian movements and states are aggressively pursuing their diversified agenda, and the global “rules-based order” is not only contested but in increasing disarray, how best to shape a way ahead for Australia? A key consideration for such a strategy is to engage the society in the defence of Australia, rather than relying on the ADF to be the sole segment of society responsible for defence. It is also a case that government officials and strategists acting as high priests discerning what force structure one needs in the future cannot enable the society and the economy to handle the shock of accelerating global disorder. Recently, at the Williams Foundation Seminar held on April 11, 2024, former Australian Secretary of Home Affairs, Mike Pezzullo, suggested a way ahead. Pezzullo focused on Australian efforts to become capable of significant strides in sustainability and organizing its ready and reserve forces for a defence of Australia which would allow the island continent to become a strategic operational reserve for its Indo-Pacific allies, with the United States being central but not the only ally engaged in such an operational approach. This is what he underscored at the seminar about considering the impact of armed conflict across the region upon Australia: It is probable that we would face at a minimum, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and essential services. Cognitive warfare would be employed using technology enabled propaganda and disinformation, which will be aimed at degrading Australia’s national will. We could not rule out the possibility of more direct action also being taken. From the perspective of the United States, I would consider Australia as the vital southern bastion in any such war in relation to a number of publicly declared intelligence, surveillance, communications and space activities in support of potential U.S. operations in the South China Sea, in the South Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean, and as a haven as required for the dispersal of U.S. forces and as a logistics maintenance and sustainment support base. If I were an American, I would also have an expectation that Australia would carry the bulk of the burden in its home theater, without unduly calling on U.S. assistance, especially where we’re stretched U.S. forces to be engaged simultaneously in combat operations in Europe, the Middle East, as well as in the Indo Pacific, if war was come to pass. This means that defence of the Australian theatre would be a higher priority for our defence planning than sending our forces forward, except for perhaps some on a limited scale. And as our principal contribution to the war effort would, in fact, be the defence of the homeland. As such, it would also be central to an adversary’s calculations about whether, when, where to strike us and how heavily. This will have implications for how we think about force structure and how to employ it operationally. That is we need to think of the ADF as an integrated and focused force optimized for a campaign on and around our territory, and in the broader airspace, seas and islands of the Australian theater of operations. On April 16, 2024, I had a chance to meet with Mike Pezzullo and to discuss the way ahead. He provided an assessment of a way ahead that would meed to be embedded in Australian culture. He started by discussing the Australian way of war. Defence has been experienced largely as an away game, and in major conflict playing a support role to a major ally. As he explained: “We are not Israel. We are not Ukraine. We are not Finland. We have not experienced the geographical proximity of war which drives consideration for all of society mobilization considerations.” What has changed is the central significance of Australia as a location within an expanded Indo-Pacific conflict. The means of war already touch Australia daily, whether they be cyber or cognitive warfare. Pezzullo underscored: “Not just the Americans, but our Japanese and South Korean allies look at us as the southern bastion of a comprehensive defence system to secure our interests.” The realty is simply that a 21st century defence effort rests on a significant expansion of a viable security system for the society and the economy. Much can be done with public engagement in strengthening Austrian security which also provides a more viable and sustainable defence of Australia capability. Engagement of society in this effort in terms of steady state efforts rather than creating panic such as happened too often in the pandemic is possible. To build on public awareness of the kind of threats posed by China and other authoritarian players to Australia is an important way ahead for working ways ahead for a more resilient and sustainable Australian economy and society. As Pezzullo emphasized: “There are several things we can do with regard to hardening telecommunications networks, actions to promoted greater energy security, shaping emergency preparations for medical care and so on that are necessary for handling emergencies and are necessary for our viability, which also prepare us for mobilization in case of war. “We need to have ongoing discussions with sectors of the economy involved in key questions affecting continuity in a period of conflict, and this work must be realistic and precise, if not always done in public. “How would we secure supplies in cases where shipping would be either cut off completely or significantly impaired? How would we ensure connectivity to support the war effort and to keep the central functions of society going when there’s a massive attack on internet underseas cables?” In my view, this is a shift from the high-priest vision of defence leadership to one more attune to 21st century defence needs, namely broader engagement of sectors of the economy and society in the enhanced security for the nation, which lays the foundation for more effective defence going forward.

Dates for 2024 are Financial members and Defence personnel are invited to attend our Williams Foundation Errol McCormack Lunches. Thursday 11 April 2024 The Multi-domain Requirements of an Australian Maritime Strategy - Conference proceedings and articles Thursday 26 September 2024 For conference details and to register click here To apply for membership click here Inquiries: events@williamsfoundation.org.au

Financial members are invited to attend our Williams Foundation Errol McCormack Lunches. Dates for 2024 are Thu 22 February - AIRMSHL Leon Phillips OAM, Chief Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Thu 23 May - GPCAPT Brett Williams, Officer Commanding Air Academy, RAAF Base Williams speaking on Contemporary Aircrew Training: How are we scaling up aircrew training to meet the strategic need? Wed 31 July - Ed Zioss, President Space and Airborne Systems, L3 Harris Thu 29 August - Speaker TBA Thu 21 November - Speaker TBA To register for a lunch click here To apply for membership click here Inquiries: events@williamsfoundation.org.au

Dr Robbin Laird Final Report: The Multi-Domain Requirements of an Australian Maritime Strategy 11 April 2024 More articles from Dr Laird are posted in Event Proceedings Synopsis and Program Conference speakers AIRMSHL Geoff Brown AO (Retd) Chair, Sir Richard Williams Foundation Host SQNLDR Sally Knox Sir Richard Williams Foundation MC Crises, what crisis? Policy perspectives and strategic coherence Peter Jennings AO, PSM, Director Strategic Analysis Australia The Defence of Australia in the 2020s Mike Pezzullo AO Cost-effective options, time, and space: air power in Australia’s maritime strategy Chris McInnes, Executive Director, Air Power Institute Maritime Strategy Perspectives Michael Outram APM, Commissioner Australian Border Force Aligning Maritime Strategy with Capability AIRCDRE Ross Bender, Director General Air Combat Capability – Air Force Some thoughts on Combat Management System interoperability in the maritime domain Liam Catterson, Business Development Manager, Lockheed Martin Australia Maritime Strategy: A Global Perspective Jennifer Parker, National Security College, ANU Space strategy perspectives for Maritime and beyond Nick Miller, Optus Defence SATCOM Achieving Information Advantage in a Maritime Strategy MAJGEN Ana Duncan AM, CSC, Commander Cyber Command Layered Defence: The role of Autonomy and autonomous systems in the Maritime James Lawless, Head of Campaign – Maritime and Undersea Northrop Grumman Australia Multi Domain Requirements of a National Defence Strategy MAJGEN Jason Walk AM, Commander Joint Logistics (rep CJC) Multi-domain C2 Considerations of a Maritime Strategy AVM Mike Kitcher AM, DSM, Former Deputy Chief Joint Operations Navy Perspective RADM Stephen Hughes AM, CSC, RAN, Head Navy Capability (representing Chief of Navy) Army Perspective BRIG James Davis, Director General Future Land Warfare (representing Chief of Army) Air Domain Perspective AIRCDRE Mick Durant, Director General Strategy and Planning – Air Force (representing Chief of Air Force)